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SUCCESSIVE STATE AND FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE: BARTKUS V. ILLINOIS REVISITED
Despite the clear importance traditionally
ascribed to constitutional protections against
double jeopardy,' state and federal courts have
nonetheless ignored the bar where a second prosecution for an allegedly illegal act occurred in a
governmental jurisdiction different from that of
the first trial. In a long line of decisions culminating with the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Barikus v. Illinois,3 the courts have
I Although its exact origin is unknown, double
jeopardy is one of the oldest principles found in the
legal tradition of western civilization. It appears to
have been known to the Greeks and Romans, and
evidence of it is found in the early writings of the
Canon Law. In England, some form of former jeopardy
plea may have existed as early as the Twelfth Century,
and by the time of Blackstone its principles were firmly
embedded in the common law.
Protection in the United States against double
jeopardy has its origin in the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution and in the constitutions of
forty-five states. The remaining five states (Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and
Vermont) include the double jeopardy protection in
their common law. For excellent discussions of the
history of double jeopardy see Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (Black, J., dissenting); Sigler, A
History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAL, HiST. 283
(1963).
The common law of former jeopardy is grounded on
the maxim that no man ought to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense.
It stems primarily from recognition of the unfairness of
allowing the state with all its resources to repeatedly
attempt to convict an individual of an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to considerable embarrassment,
expense and anxiety. The guarantee apparently also
recognizes that repeated prosecutions hamper judicial
economy and, more important, increase the likelihood
of convicting an innocent man. See Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-89 (1959).
2Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). For excellent articles in the field of successive prosecutions by state and
federal governments see Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two
Sovereignties, and t1 Intruding Constitution, 28 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 591 (1961); Comment, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Anotlher Exercise

in Federali.sm,80H
Hv. L. REv. 1538 (1967); Comment,
Successive Prosecutions by State and Federal Governments for Offenses Arising Out of tIe Same Act, 44 MEN.
L. REV. 534 (1960).
3359 U.S. 121 (1959).

consistently held that such prosecutions are con4
stitutionally permissible.
In Bartkus the petitioner was tried and acquitted
of a federal charge of robbing a federally insured
bank. On substantially the same evidence he was
subsequently tried in an Illinois court for violation
of a state statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the
state court decision, ruling that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment did not apply
to the states.5 Further, the Court said that the
lower court decision should be upheld even assuming the applicability to the states of the double
jeopardy protections because under a theory of dual
sovereignty there was no violation of the double
jeopardy clause. The latter doctrine, in essence,
states that every citizen of the United States is also
a citizen of a state or territory, that he owes
allegiance to two sovereigns, and that he may be
punished for a single act which violates the laws of
both.6
Ten years later, in Bento= v. Maryland,7 the
Court reversed its former position and ruled that
the double jeopardy clause was applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the four4E.g., Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943);
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); Moore v.
Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); United States v.
Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850); Fox v. Ohio,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
' In ruling that the double jeopardy clause is inapplicable to the states, the Court relied upon Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). There, the Court
held that the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states
through the fourteenth amendment except in cases
where a denial of a tight would be so "repugnant to
the conscience of mankind" as to constitute a denial of
due process. The Court decided that though the prohibition against double jeopardy was important, its
use was generally not essential to a fair and enlightened
system of justice except where, for example, there was
evidence that the state was "attempting to wear the
accused out by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials." Id. at 327-28.
6The clearest formulation of this doctrine can be
found in Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20
(1852), and in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377,
382 (1922).
7395 U.S. 784 (1969).

STUDENT COMMENT

teentli amendment. Hence, of the two rationales
used by the Court in Bartkvs only the concept of
dual sovereignty remains at issue. There have been
indications since the Bartku decision, however,
that even this principle may be eroding,8 primarily
because of the Court's growing concern for the
preservation of individual rights and protections.
Therefore, it seems relevant to again examine the
viability of the Bartkus doctrine. Specifically, it is
the purpose of this brief commentary to consider
the prospects for a judicial repudiation of Bartkus
and, also, to examine various alternatives to the
Barikus rule.
PROSPECTS FOR THE JUDICIAL REPUDIATION OF

BARTKUS: THE DECLINE OF =

DUAL

SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
The dual sovereignty principle was originally
formulated by the United States Supreme Court
in three decisions occurring between 1847 and
1852. 9 The rationale behind the doctrine is unclear,
although some commentators suggest that the
burning issues of slavery and state sovereignty
forced the Court in at least one of these early cases
to either avoid ruling in a way which might restrict
the states' power to punish criminal offenses or
risk violent opposition from the Southern states.10
The Southern states genuinely feared that a rule
which could prevent them from prosecuting a
crime once it had been pre-empted by the federal
government would undermine their law enforcement system and thereby ultimately threaten their
sovereignty. Hence, the Court's willingness to
allow the Constitution's concern for protection of
citizens against double jeopardy to be subordinated
to the dual sovereignty theory was motivated by
its concern for the continued well-being of the
federal system. It is this same regard for the smooth
functioning of the federal system which provided
the rationale for the Court's reaffirmance of the
dual sovereignty rule in Bartkus v. Illinois."
I E.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
U.S. 52 (1964); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960).
9Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847); United
States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850);
Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
10Comment, 80 HAnv. L. REv., supra note 2, at
1541. For a detailed analysis of pressure brought on the
Court during this period see 2 C. WAMRN, TuE SUPREMiE COURT IN UNITED STATES HisTORY 83-273
(1926).
" The Court underscored its point by citing the case
of Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944), where
the defendant was convicted of a certain federal offense
having a maximum penalty of only two years imprison-
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In recent years, the Supreme Court has appeared
less convinced of the federal system's need for a
rigid application of the dual sovereignty principle.
In reappraising the relations between the sovereign
states of the federal system, the Court has acknowledged that the hostile atmosphere which
necessitated the harsh application of the dual
sovereignty theory in 1847 may no longer exist to
its former degree.' In addition, the Court has
shown increased concern for the effect of the doctrine on individual rights and interests."

The key developments have occurred in the
areas of protection against self-incrimination and
illegal search and seizure. In the past, when dealing
with these areas, the courts adhered strictly to the
principles of dual sovereignty, with little regard for
the doctrine's effect on individual rights and
interests. 4 Accordingly, they had held that the
fourth 5 and fifth 6 amendments placed no limitations on state activities and, conversely, that
state constitutional guarantees placed no restraint
on federal actions 7 Although these decisions
preserved separate spheres of state and federal
ment. The defendant was also subject to indictment
under a similar statute in the state court providing
the death penalty. Although the state never indicted
the defendant, the court in dictum noted that this
would have been permissible. 325 U.S. at 108 n.10.
In Bartkus, the Court contended that to allow federal
prosecution of a comparatively minor offense to prevent
state prosecution "would be a shocking and untoward
deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the
states to maintain peace and order within their confines." For example, in Bartkus the state of Illinois
had a special interest in the defendant beyond the
commission of a particular crime. Finding Bartkus
guilty as charged made him an habitual offender under
Illinois law and thereby subjected him to life imprisonment. Hence, the Court felt that a rule barring successive state-federal prosecutions could work to defeat
the interest of sovereignties, such as Illinois, in implementing effective law enforcement policies.
"Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. at
55-56.
u E.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 215.
14 See Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and
Seizure and Self-Incrimination, 42 CORNELL L. Q. 346
(1957); Comment, Federal-State Cooperation in the
Area of Self-Incrimination and Double Jeopardy, 55

Nw. U.L. REv. 110 (1960).
"1The fourth amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to he searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
,1The fifth amendment reads in part: "..nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb...."
"7Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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influence, and thereby may have served some vague
interest of the federal system, 18 they also opened
the way for the state and federal governments to do
together what they had long been forbidden to do
individually 9
For example, although the exclusionary rule of
the fourth amendment generally prevents the
federal courts from accepting evidence illegally
obtained by federal officers, 20 the Supreme Court,
under its so-called "silver platter" doctrine, once
held it permissible to admit evidence illegally
obtained by state authorities 2 or private parties.2
Thus, state troopers could illegally seize evidence
not admissible in a state court and then turn it
over "on a silver platter" to a federal court which
could make full use of it so long as no federal participation was shown.23 Hence, through such
"hand-in-glove" activities, state and federal
authorities could together easily circumvent constitutional and statutory protections against illegal
searches and seizures.
The dual sovereignty principle also served for all
practical purposes to nullify the privilege against

courts could constitutionally receive such evidence.216 In that opinion the Court again disregarded the personal interests and liberties involved,
and instead relied upon the principle of dual
sovereignty.
... ever since Barron v. Baltimore... one of the

settled principles of our Constitution has been that
these amendments [The Bill of Rights] protect
only against invasion of civil liberties by the
Government whose conduct they alone limit. Conversely, a state cannot by operating within its
constitutional powers restrict the operations of the
National Government within its sphere. The distinctive operations of the two governments within
their respective spheres is basic to our federal constitutional system, howsoever complicated and
difficult the practical accommodations to it may
be.?

The Court's traditional position towards the dual
sovereignty theory began to erode shortly after
8
the Bartkus case when in Elkins v. United StateS2
it ruled that evidence illegally seized by state
29
officials would be inadmissible in a federal court
self-incrimination. For instance, in Jack v. Kansas24 The decision's importance here lies in the Court's
the Supreme Court held it constitutional for a approach to the problem. For the first time, the
state court to compel testimony even though it Court recognized that the increase in federal-state
might subject the witness to prosecution in the cooperation could conceivably frustrate the rights
federal courts. Correspondingly, in Feldman v. of the.individual. Hence, the Court chose to conUnited Stals,25 the Court held that the federal sider the challenged act in light of its effect on the
i8 See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
accused,0 ' and, ultimately, to allow the interests of
29For instance, state troopers could illegally seize
federalism to be subordinated where necessary to
evidence not admissible in a state court and then turn
it over to a federal court which could make full use of adhere to fundamental constitutional protections.3"
it as long as no federal participation was shown.
The Court, however, did not abandon its concern
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927);
federalism. On the contrary, it attempted to
for
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). See also
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Weeks v. justify its arguments partly in terms of its beneStates, 232 U.S. 383, (1914).
United
ficial effect on the federal system.'
20
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949);
Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2
The very essence of a healthy federalism depends
1 Id.
2 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
upon the avoidance of needless conflict between
2
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949);
state and federal courts. Yet when a Federal Court
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). Simisitting in an exclusionary state admits evidence
larly, the protection against illegal searches and seizures
lawlessly seized by state agents, it not only frus338
is not binding upon the states. Wolf v. Colorado,
trates state policy but frustrates that policy in a
U.S. 25 (1949), and state courts have had no compunc26
tions about receiving into evidence the ill-gotten gains
Id. at 492. In the federal courts, the fact that
of federal officers. E.g., Terrano v. State, 59 Nev.
may result in prosecution for a state crime
testimony
442
247, 91 P.2d 67 (1939); State v. Lacy, 212 N.W.
excuse for failure to testify.
(N.D. 1927); See also Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. REv., is no
27322 U.S. at 490-91.
supra note 14. Contra, Parsons, supra note 14.
364 U.S. 206 (1960).
24 199 U.S. 372 (1905). The defendant was found
29
Shortly thereafter, the Court applied its rule in the
a
with
to
comply
refusing
for
guilty of contempt
situation, indicating that evidence illegally
converse
This
court.
a
state
in
to
testify
statute compelling him
would similarly be excluded
he refused to do despite a statutory provision granting obtained by federal officials
him immunity from state criminal prosecutions based from state prosecutions. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
on his testimony. The defendant claimed that the 657-58 (1961).at 215.
20 364 U.S.
statute did not protect him from a federal action based
22
Id. at 221.
on the same testimony.
Id.
25 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
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particularly inappropriate and ironic way. For by
admitting the unlawfully seized evidence the Federal Court serves to defeat the States' effort to
assure obedience to the Federal Constitution.n
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The nearest the Court has come of late to dealing
with the separate sovereignties problem within a
double jeopardy context occurred in Waller v.
40
Florida.
In that case the Court found that successive
trials
of a person for the same act in both a
A second important change in the Court's
state
and
municipal
court constituted a violation
application of the dual sovereignty principle
1
double jeopardy protection
4
Constitution's
the
of
occurred in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission."
There the Court held that a witness in a state The state had argued that such double prosecutions
proceeding may not be compelled to give testimony are permissible under the dual sovereignty rationale
which may be incriminating under federal law of Bartkus v. Illinois, analogizing the relationship
unless the compelled testimony and its fruits could between a municipality and the state to that which
not be used in any way by federal officials in con- exists between a state and the federal government'
nection with a criminal prosecution against him. Although this argument created the opportunity to
The decision vindicated the minority position in reconsider the merits of Bartkus, the Court avoided
Feldman v. United States,3 5 Knapp v. Schweitzer,36 the issue and instead ruled that the separate
and Mills v. Lovisiana which criticized the Court sovereignty approach used in Bartkus was inapfor leaving a loophole through which state and plicable to the state-municipal situation."
The Court found the relationship between state
federal authorities working together could circumand
municipal governments more closely correvent a portion of the Bill of Rights-in this case
sponded
with that existing between the United
the right against self-incrimination. The principle
in Murphy seems similarly applicable to a Barthus- States and its territorial governments, to which
the Supreme Court had specifically found the dual
type situation where a federal authority could
sovereignty
principle inapplicable.44 In Grafton v.
sidestep the double jeopardy provision by employ45
ing the services of the state which, through its United States the Court had held that while the
government
of a state does not derive its powers
authority, could act as a facade for a second federal
from
the
federal
government, a territorial governprosecution.
ment
owes
its
existence
wholly to the United
Together, the Elkins and Murphy decisions
indicate a substantial modification of the dual States and, hence, trial of a person for the same
sovereignty principle. The Court has departed offense in both a federal and territorial court
to two trials by the same sovereign
from its formal, syllogistic approach to the problem amounts
46
and become more concerned with the general power. Similarly, the Court in Waller reasoned
picture as determined by the balancing of the that the power to charge a person in a municipal
various personal and institutional interests in- court springs from the same organic law that
creates the state courts. It followed, then, that
volved. Nonetheless, the Bartkus rule has remained
secure. All federal court decisions since that case the Court would conclude that the trial of the
defendant first in a municipal court and then in a
have followed the Court's position.u Moreover,
state
court for the same offense also amounted to
the Court itself has avoided a rehearing of the issue
trial twice in the same sovereignty and, hence,
in several instances. 39
(1970); Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837 (8th
3 This argument may eventually form the rationale
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902 (1965).
for extending greater protection to citizens of those Cir.),
40 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
41
states having statutes forbidding successive state1d. at 395.
4
federal prosecutions. It could be argued, for example,
2Id. at 392.
that prosecuting a person in a federal court after he
41 Id. at 394.
had already undergone a state trial would frustrate the
44 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
policy of the state which had, as shown by enacting a
45 206 U.S. 333. In Grafton a soldier in the United
statute, intended to save its citizens from the rigors of
States Army was acquitted by a general court-martial
successive prosecutions.
convened in the Philippine Islands for the alleged killing
34378 U.S. 52 (1964).
of two men. Subsequently, the soldier was charged
35322 U.S. 487 (1944) (Black, J., dissenting).
and convicted of the same offense in a Philippine court.
36 357 U.S. 371 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
At that time the islands were a federal territory. The
360 U.S. 230 (1959) (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
38E.g., Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837 (8th Supreme Court held that the first prosecution by the
United States court was a bar to a subsequent prosecuCir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902 (1965); Hoopengarner
tion by a territorial court since both were arms of the
v. United States, 270 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1959).
39Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395 (1970);
same sovereign.
40206 U.S. at 354-55.
Hutul v. United States, 416 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1969),
47 397 U.S. at 393.
cert. denied, 90 S.Ct. 573, reh. denied, 90 S.Ct. 1519
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violated the double jeopardy protections applied
to the state through the fourteenth amendment.0
The Court's ruling in Waller, therefore, is not
theoretically inconsistent with the application of
dual sovereignty principles to a Bartkus-like situation. The decision, however, is a significant limitation on the scope of the dual sovereignty principle
and, hence, Waller may further reflect the Court's
increasing willingness to limit the number of situations in which the dual sovereignty principle may
facilitate government encroachment upon individual rights and interests.
To date, the sole judicial challenge to Bartkus
has come from Ohio, where in State v. Fletcher49
a Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court judge,
and subsequently the Ohio Court of Appeals,0
refused to follow the Bartkus decision. Judge
Manos, who when speaking for the Common Pleas
Court referred to Bartkus as an "historic pile of
rubble" 11and accordingly predicted its reversal,
suggested that the dual sovereignty rule' fails
because it assumes that the state and federal
governments will, whenever possible, seek to subvert the other by trying to impede the functioning
of the other's law enforcement agencies5 2 His
point is particularly strong in view of the substantial change that has occurred in relations
between state and federal governments, especially
in the area of law enforcement. For instance, in the
era in which the dual sovereignty doctrine was
formulated 1 the states were often at odds with the
federal government, which they sometimes looked
upon as a rival.N At that time, to assert that one
sovereignty might use the bar of former jeopardy
as a means of subverting the other's criminal law
enforcement system, and ultimately its powers,
was not entirely unreasonable. Today, however,
as the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged, we
are in the age of "Cooperative Federalism". 5
More than ever before, the states and the federal
government are joining together to wage a united
fight against crime, 56 and although day-by-day
criminal administration remains primarily a state
48Id.

49 15 Ohio Misc. 336, 240 N.E.2d 905, 44 Ohio Ops.2d
498 (Cuyahoga C.P. 1968).
50259 N.E.2d 146, 51 Ohio Ops. 2d 183 (Ct. App.
1970).
6 240 N.E.2d at 907.
2
6
Id.at 911.
53
See note 9 supra.
4

65

C. WARREN,

supra note 10.

Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52,
55-56
(1964).
6
5 1d. at 56.

and local responsibility,57 the federal government
now provides state and local authorities with
substantial funds, information, advice, and training.53 The federal government has also passed
statutes aiding the states in coping with certain
troublesome areas of law enforcement such as
interstate crime operations, 9 and has cooperated
in numerous hand-in-glove efforts with state
authorities to investigate crimes, gather evidence,
and prosecute criminals.10
It appears, then, that the dual sovereignty
principle is an anachronism, that it has outlived
the purposes for which it was created, and that it
should either be eliminated or substantially modified. Yet, on the contrary, there are a number of
situations in which supporters of the doctrine claim
that it is still useful. For instance, in Screws v.
United States6 ' the defendant was convicted in a
federal court under a statute with a maximum
penalty of two years imprisonment. In the state
court, however, the offense carried a death penalty.
Hence, some supporters of the Barlkus rule contend
that its demise would seriously hinder law enforcement by giving the defendant an "easy way" out
of trouble. This argument, however, incorrectly
assumes that the defendant in all cases would be
permitted to choose the court in which he was to be
tried. 2 Secondly, there are few situations which
would parallel the Screws factual context. Also,
most criminal matters are still left entirely to state
and local authorities 1 and, where there is federal
legislation, it is either designed to complement or
aid state law enforcement efforts,4 or is concerned
7

6 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocrETY:
REPORT BY THE PREsIDENT'S ComassioN ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMJnsTRAriON or JUsTIcE

A

283 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as CRUM DT A
FRE
SociE].
5
Id. at 286. For example, the National Crime
Information Center, now being developed by the FBI,
will provide instantaneous response to computer inquiry by local agencies for information on such things
as stolen automobiles and wanted persons. See also
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
82 Stat.
§§197, 638, 1236 (1968).
9
E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§2312, 2314 (1969) (penalizes
the transportation of stolen goods, vehicles, securities,
etc.,0 in interstate or foreign commerce).
E.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960);
Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); Gambino
v. United States, 275 U.S. 311 (1927).
6325 U.S. 91 (1945).

&2Change of venue will not be granted merely to
suit the convenience of the accused, Johnston v.
United States, 351 U.S. 215 (1956), but rather must
depend upon the existence of factors which would make
change of venue necessary for a fair trial.
6 CRIME IN A FREE Socrezr,

64See e.g., note 59 supra.

suPranote 57, at 283.
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with matters not normally of state concern.m
Finally, it is probable that in this age of cooperative federalism, where state and federal governments have a common interest in crime control,
state and federal authorities would through negotiation avoid a situation like Screws before it ever
occurred.
Perhaps the most compelling argument for
continuing the Bartkus rule is its effect on civil
rights actions.66 Historically, certain states have
demonstrated an extreme reluctance to punish
persons violating the civil rights laws, especially
where public sentiment is hostile to the victim.Y
It has been suggested that even where the state
does prosecute, its reluctance can lead to incompetent prosecution." Hence, the option of a second
trial in the federal courts seems essential to ensure
that fairness prevails in cases of alleged civil rights
violations.
This theory, however, has been rejected as
unrealistic.69 In a situation where a "sham" trial
can be shown, the defendant can be retried without
Bartkus simply on the theory that because of the
"sham" he was never in jeopardy7 0 It is true,
however, that the collusion or incompetency necessary to show a "sham" trial may be difficult to
prove, but nevertheless, this defense provides
much of the protection given the federal system by
Bartkus without seriously jeopardizing the rights
of individuals in other kinds of trials. In reality,
neither protection is really significant in civil
rights cases because, except in the most extreme
cases,n there appears to be a uniform Justice
Department policy to avoid prosecutions of alleged
civil rights violators where a state has already
instituted criminal action of its own against the
accused.
It seems that the best indication of federalism's
need for Bartkus' rigid application of the dual
61E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§1381-85 (1970) (crimes against
the military such as enticing desertion and harboring
deserters).
66For an excellent discussion of this subject, see
Comment, 80 HARv. L. REV., supranote 2, at 1551-54.
7 Comment, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil
Rights Crimes, 74 YAix L.J. 1297,1298 (1965).
Comment, HAzv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1551.
69 Id.

v. State, 219 Miss. 741, 69 So.2d 837 (1954);
cf. Newton v. State, 170 P. 270 (Okla. 1918).
7 E.g., in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966),
a black army officer was murdered while traveling
through Georgia. The defendants were prosecuted for
murder in Georgia and acquitted by jury verdict.
7 Comment, 74 YALE LJ., supra note 67, at 1298.
70 Smith

See also UNITED STATES CO-SSION ON CIVI-L RioTs,
REPORT

(Book 5) at 58-59 (1961).
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sovereignty rule can be found in the attitudes of
the legislators and law enforcement officials themselves. Almost one-third of the states now have
statutes barring a state trial after a federal prosecution of the same defendant for the same criminal
act,n and, to date, there are no hints of dissatisfaction or claims that these statutes adversely affect
law enforcement. Similarly, the Federal Government has for certain offenses passed laws permitting
a prior state prosecution to act as a bar to prosecution under those provisions, again without any
noticeable repercussions. 4 The Attorney-General
of the United States himself has on at least one
occasion instructed United States Attorneys to
keep second prosecutions to the minimumY5
Hence, it seems specious to argue that overruling
Bartkus will seriously hamper law enforcement
when the law-makers themselves show little
interest in preserving the rule.
THE ALTERNATIVES TO THE BAIRTKUS RULE

Bartkus has rightfully been criticized for mechanically subordinating individual rights and
interests to those of governmental institutions.76
The Supreme Court itself has suggested that this
may be so, but has reasoned that this is part of the
price to be paid for federalism 7 It seems doubtful,
however, that the founding fathers viewed federalism as an end in itself, nor is it likely that they
regarded individual rights as a secondary objective.
On the other hand, it seems equally questionable
whether they intended to completely exalt the
individual without some regard for the effect of
such a policy on the smooth functioning of the
federal system. It seems, then, that the problem is
not simply to decide whether to overrule Bartkus,
but also to find a suitable alternative to that rule
which achieves the proper balance between the
individual and institutional interests involved.
The most appealing approach seems to be the
adoption of one of several selective pre-emption
schemes, each of which would abate the rigors of
Bartkus without seriously hampering law enforcement activity. The first of these was suggested by
Walter Fisher, the attorney for Bartkus, who
proposed that the burden of selection be initially
placed on the accusedis Under his proposal, if the
73See Comment, 44 MINm. L. REv., supra note 2,
at 74
539 n.31.
E.g., 18 U.S.C. §2117 (1970).
71
Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 531 (1960).
76
See Comment, 44 MIN. L. REv. at 537.
7 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1958).
78Fisher, Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50 MINN.
L. REV. 607, 610-13 (1966).
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accused chose and received a federal trial, a second
trial in the state court would then be barred. If,
on the other hand, the defendant selected a state
forum, the ensuing state action would then be
regarded as the final disposition of the matter.
To limit the accused's ability to "forum shop"
for the jurisdiction with the lightest penalties, the
defendant's right to choose his forum is qualified by
giving the federal government the option of refusing jurisdiction, thereby ensuring a state trial.
Fisher's plan has the advantage of leaving primary responsibility for criminal law enforcement
in the hands of state and local authorities while
protecting the rights of the accused. This follows
because most criminal matters are still handled by.
state and local authorities and, accordingly, it is
expected that federal authorities will in most cases
be inclined to let the state prosecute, even when
the accused elects a federal trial. This is precisely
the hope of Fisher, who says that to avoid endangering the viability of the-Federal system, the
federal government must be careful not to pre-empt
the states except to the extent necessary to protect
9
special federal interestsY
The principal defect of Fisher's approach is
evident within the civil rights context. By permitting the accused to select the court in which he
is to be tried, Southern civil rights violators could
by choosing the state court often ensure a sympathetic jury. This possibility, however, could conceivably be foreclosed by use of a second form of
selective pre-emption which would empower the
federal government to obtain a stay of state
prosecution whenever it believed a federal trial
9
necessary to protect national interests Accordingly, federal authorities could assert jurisdiction
where the government felt civil rights violators
would be dealt with lightly. Otherwise, federal
authorities would in most cases be expected to
leave matters to the states. Hence, as in the first
kind of selective pre-emption, the primary responsibility for the administration of crininal law
would continue to remain with state and local
officials.
A third possibility would be to consider both the
state and federal offenses together in a single trial.
This result could be realized through adoption of a
theory similar to pendent jurisdiction in which a
federal court could hear state and federal claims
together in a single trial where they "derive from
79Id.

at 611.

80See Comment, 80 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2,

at 1555.

a common nucleus of operative fact." 8 To apply
this kind of doctrine to a criminal trial situation
seems fully consistent with its basic policy underpinnings which have their roots in the need for the
conservation of judicial energy and the avoidance
of multiplicity of litigation. Pendent jurisdiction,
however, is a matter of judicial discretion and not
8'
a constitutional right. There is no precedent for
its application to a criminal trial situation. Further, because joining state and criminal prosecu14
tions involves joinder of different plaintiffs, it is
questionable whether pendent jurisdiction's re5
quirement of a single cause of action would be
88
satisfied. Hence, pendent jurisdiction is unlikely
to be instituted except through reciprocal state and
federal legislation.
Considerable attention has been given a certain
theory alternatively referred to as the separate
8'
interest, social interest, or separate gist theory
Although this theory admits the constitutionality
of successive prosecutions, in application it is
intended to limit their scope. Essentially, it involves an analysis of the different social interests
affected by the offenses against the two sovereignties.P Where the interests to be protected by the
two statutes are substantially the same, a second
prosecution would be barred. Conversely, where
the interests sought to be protected are different,
ftlUnited Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966). As originally conceived, the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction permitted a state claim to be heard in the
federal court when its relationship with the state claim
permitted the conclusion that the entire action before
the court comprised but one constitutional "case."
Id. at 725. It was derived from the realization noted by
the Court in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 733, at 820 (1824). that "[t]here is
scarcely any case, every part of which depends on the
constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
Hence, the Court recognized that to literally follow
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution would in most
cases prevent the exercise of original jurisdiction. See
Comment, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of
Pendent Jurisdictionin the Federal Courts, 62 CoLuI.
L.8RFv. 1018 (1962).
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
8"Id.

' E.g., the state and federal governments.
8-Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245 (1933).
6See United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co.,
191 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1960). In that case the
court ruled that separate causes of action were presented when employees attempted to join their own
contract claims with that of their union in a suit by
the latter under section 301 of the Labor Management
Act.
Relations
8
7See Fisher, supra note 78, at 616-19; Comment,
80 HAsv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1559-64; Note, 45
CoRNEri L. Ruv. 574, 578-79 (1960).
88Cf. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuK.E L.J. 171.
8

[Vol. 62

STUDENT COMMENT

each sovereignty would be entitled to hold separate This approach, though attractive in theory, can
prosecutions with respect to the interest with which lead to abuses nullifying its protective effect. For
it was concerned. Under this theory the second example, by making slight variations in the eleBartkus prosecution would have been barred since ments of an offense, some states could conceivably
the purposes of both federal89 and state90 statutes circumvent the double prosecution rule." Consewere to prevent and punish robberies of banks.
quently, some commentators have suggested that
There have been a number of cases where the it would be better to hinge the raising of the bar
separate interests test has been applied in uphold- simply on whether in both cases the same transing successive prosecutions. 91 Nonetheless, the action was involved. 9 This approach is embodied
theory has come under considerable criticism. in the Model Penal Code," and was recently apFor example, justice Brennan was so disturbed by proved by Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marit that he wrote a separate opinion in Abbate v. shall in Ashe v. Swenson."°9
United States for the sole purpose of expressing his
There are some critics who contend that protecdisapproval." Brennan suggested that the rationale tion of the accused would be best afforded by
behind the test as applied to a multi-jurisdictional applying a collateral estoppel theory."' Under
context might similarly be used to permit multiple this approach a former judgment would operate
prosecutions in the same jurisdiction. This he said as an estoppel as to those issues already considered
could occur where the questioned conduct violated by another court. Where a state court has deterseveral ordinances, each of which was enacted to mined that the accused did not participate in a
serve a different social interest.
certain robbery, the federal court would, under
The separate interest theory has also been
this theory, be prevented from relitigating that
criticized for the difficult analysis of interests that issue in a subsequent prosecution of the same deit would require, especially where several interests fendant. 10
intermingle.93 One commentator, however, has
The doctrine was originally used only in civil
suggested that the analysis required is no harder suits, but has seen increasing use in the criminal
than that often faced by most judges in their
might have been convicted upon by proof of the
normal duties. 1 Further, it is possible that by
facts contained in the second indictment, an acgiving the judges greater discretion the courts
quittal on the first indictment can be no bar to
the second.
would be better able to preserve the institutional
97Mr. Justice Brennan best summed up these abuses
and individual interests involved. 95
in his concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson, 397
Another alternative to the Bartkus rule is to bar U.S. 436 (1970) at 451-52: The "same evidence"
a second prosecution where the evidence required test ... does not enforce but virtually annuls the
constitutional guarantee. For example, where a single
to convict is the same as needed in the first trial. 9
criminal episode involves several victims under the
"same evidence" test a separate prosecution may be
918 U.S.C. §2113 (1950).
brought as to each. E.g., State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496,
90ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §602 (1951).
122 A.2d 628 (1956), aJfd, 356 U.S. 464 (1958). The
"1E.g., Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d
"same evidence" test permits multiple prosecutions
465 (6th Cir. 1959); United States v. Wapnick, 198 F. where a single transaction is divisible into
chronoSupp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Commonwealth v. Taylogically discrete crimes. E.g., Johnson v. Commonlor, 193 Pa. Super. 360, 165 A.2d 390 (1960).
wealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923) (each of 75
1359 U.S. at 196.
poker hands a separate "offense"). Even a single crimi"Note, 45 CoRNELL L.Q. 574, 578-79 (1960).
nal act may lead to multiple prosecutions if it is viewed
94Comment, 80 HAzv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1562.
from the perspectives of different statutes. E.g., State
9"For instance, conviction of certain offenses in a

state court may result in long imprisonment, whereas
in a federal court the same act may result in only a fine.
To avoid allowing a criminal to escape unscathed following a federal trial, the court could permit the second
trial by ruling that the federal and state statutes serve
separate social interests. For instance, the court might
reason that the federal statute was primarily concerned
with raising revenue, whereas the state statute was
designed to police the activity involved.
6Actually, this test is already used by a majority of
the courts to determine when double jeopardy exists
within a single-jurisdictional context. It originated from
the need to determine a test for what constituted two
prosecutions for the "same offense." The test was first
articulated in The King v. Vandercomb & Abbott, 2
Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (Ex. 1796):
Unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner

v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282 (1879). Given the tendency of

modem criminal legislation to divide the phases of a
criminal transaction into numerous separate crimes,
the opportunities for multiple prosecutions for an
essential unitary criminal episode are frightening.
93 Kirchheimer,

The Act, The Offense, and Double

Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 534 (1949).
99 MODEL PENAL CODE

§§1.07(2), 1.09(1)(b) (Pro-

posed Official Draft, 1962).
100397 U.S. at 453-54 (concurring opinion).
101Fisher, supra note 2; Perkins, Collateral Estoppel
in Criminal Cases, 1960 IL.. L. FORum 533.
"' Commissioner v. Summer, 333 U.S. 591 (1948);
United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924); Cromwell
v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351 (1876). See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §45 (1942).
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law, 1"' including cases involving double jeopardy
questions.0 ' Moreover, in Ashe v. Swenson,1°
- the
Supreme Court ruled that collateral estoppel is
embodied in the fifth amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy." 8 The doctrine, however,
suffers from several defects which may render it
useless in a multi-jurisdictional context.
The first defect is not strictly limited to prosecutions by separate sovereigns, but rather clouds the
entire use of collateral estoppel in double jeopardy
situations. Because the doctrine is an evidentiary
rule designed to prevent the expense, vexation,
waste, and possible inconsistency of duplicatory
litigation, its application is limited only to the
precise issues determined by the prior court. 1Several courts have declined to apply it where they
have been unable to determine with certainty
which issues had been decided in reaching a general
verdict of acquittal, °8 and at least one court has
refused to collaterally estop trial of an issue where
there was even the slightest possibility that the
jury in the first trial reached its verdict without
considering it.'-1
The Supreme Court of the United States first
considered this issue in Hoag v. New Jersey."0 In
that case the accused was tried and acquitted for
the robbery of three men who, along with others,
had been held up in a tavern. Thereafter, the
defendant was indicted and convicted for robbing
a fourth victim of the same alleged robbery. On
appeal he argued that, because the sole disputed
issue in the earlier trial related to his identification
as a participant in the alleged robberies, the verdict
of acquittal must be taken as having resolved that
issue in his favor. Accordingly, he claimed that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel barred New Jersey
from relitigating the issue of the defendant's
103 See Perkins, supra note 101; Comment, Collateral
Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 28 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 142
(1960); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948);
United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
104E.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970);
State v. Courmier, 218 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1966).
101
397 U.S. 436 (1970).
10
6Id. at 1195. This guaranty is similarly applicable
to the states through Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969).
107E.g., United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1961); United States v. Kenney, 236 F.2d 128,
130 (3rd Cir. 1956); State v. Barton. 5 Wash.2d 234,
105 P.2d 63 (1940).
108E.g., Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 363 (1958);
United States v. Kenney, 236 F.2d 128, 130 (3rd Cir.
1956); State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600
(1950).
100United States v. Kenney, 236 F.2d 128, 139 (3rd
Cir. 1956).
11356 U.S. 464 (1958).

identity, and, hence, precluded them from convicting him in the second trial. The Supreme Court,

however, allowed the conviction to stand, declaring
that it would have to embark on sheer speculation
in order to decide that the jury's verdict at the
earlier trial necessarily embraced a determination
favorable to the petitioner on the issue of "identity." 111
The Court, however, recently reversed its position in Ashe v. Swenson, where, on facts substantially the same as in Hoag," it raised the
collateral estoppel bar. In that case the Court said:
[Tihe rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is
not to be applied with the hypertechnical and
archaic approach of a zgth century pleading book,
but with realism and rationality. Where a previous
judgment of acquittal was based upon a general
verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to "examine the record of a prior
proceeding, taking into account the pleadings,
evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and
conclude whether a rational jury could have
grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that
which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. The inquiry "must be set in a practical
frame, and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings." 14
Hence, the Court may have settled the problem of
issue determination, leaving it to the court's
discretion to determine when an issue in question
had in the earlier trial been central to the prosecutor's case.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel will not be
applied where the prior adjudication involved
different parties m and hence, there is considerable
doubt whether the doctrine can be applied to a
dual sovereignty situation. Several courts have
2u Id. at 472.
11397 U.S. 436 (1970).
1m In Ashe, six men engaged in a poker game at their
home were allegedly robbed by three or four masked
men. Petitioner and three others were each charged
with seven separate offenses-the armed robbery of
each of the six poker players and the theft of the car.
The petitioner was first tried for robbing Donald
Knight, one of the participants in the poker game. Because of weak evidence, the petitioner was acquitted.
Thereafter, he was indicted again, this time for the
robbery of another participant of the same poker game.
Eventually, he was convicted. The petitioner appealed,
claiming that the issue of his presence at the poker
game had been determined in the first trial and that
the state was collaterally estopped from relitigating
that issue in the second trial.
114397 U.S. at 444.
M United States v. Wapnick, 198 F. Supp. 359
(E.D.N.Y. 1961).
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already refused to apply the doctrine in such
cases 1 6 Yet there is some cause for optimism. In
Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins,117 the Supreme
Court held that the fact that the parties are not
precisely identical is not necessarily fatal to invoking collateral estoppel."5 Identification, the Court
said, is not a mere matter of form but of substance
and, hence, parties nominally different may in
legal effect be the same. 19 Also, in another civil
case the Court held that a state judgment could be
used to estop a second determination of the issue
in a federal court.120 Finally, collateral estoppel
is embodied in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute as a bar to successive statefederal prosecutions."'
One court in applying collateral estoppel to
successive prosecutions said the primary considerations should be fairness and fulfillment of reasonable expectations in the light of constitutional and
common law goals.
The doctine of collateral estoppel should not be
applied grudgingly. The State's resources are sufficient to enable it to prepare and present its case
thoroughly .... The broadening policy considerations in favor of safeguarding individual rights of
116E.g., Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837 (8th
Cir. 1965); People v. LoCicero, 230 N.Y.S.2d 384
(App. Div. 1962).

17310 U.S. 381,402 (1940).
n1 In Sunshine, a producer of coal sought to enjoin
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from collecting
the 19 % tax laid on sales by producers who did not
join the code established by the Bitumimous Coal
Conservation Act. The Court ruled that a prior judgment sustaining on review a determination by the
Bituminous Coal Commission (which was composed of
coal producers) that the producer's coal was "bituminous," and, hence, did not conform with the code,
was res judicata as to that point in the subsequent
trial
with the Internal Revenue Service.
1
19Id. at 402. It should be noted, however, that the
formal relationship between the parties in this case is
closer than that which would exist between the federal
government and a state. The Bituminous Coal Commission, although composed of private producers, was
quasi-governmental in nature, and might properly be
regarded as an agent of the federal government.
120Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, 279 U.S. 388
(1929). In this case Oppenheimer (0) was the inventor,
and Becher (B) was employed by 0 to construct it.

B, in breach of trust, surreptitiously obtained a patent
for the invention as his own. 0, however, in a state
court obtained a decree holding B a trustee ex maleficio
of the invention and patent, commanding him to assign
the patent to 0 and forbidding him to use, make, or
sell these machines or transfer any rights under the
patent. B then brought a suit in the federal court to
enjoin 0 from infringing the patent, but the Court held
that the decree of the state court was an estoppel
against B.
121MODEL PENAL CODE §1.10(2) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962).
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defendants and the need for conserving public
energies as well as public funds, strongly suggest
that where a jury has considered and rejected the
State's contention in favor of the Defendant's
contention on the issue submitted as the crucial
one, the matter should be permitted to rest in its
entirety. m
If a complete reversal of Bartkusis desirable, one
solution other than court action is for the states
to enact legislation making conviction or acquittal
in a federal prosecution a bar to a state prosecution.
This alternative, however, has its obvious drawbacks. First, it would take time to pass laws of this
kind, and second, because many states have not
thought it important enough to have such laws, it
is conceivable that protection might never be
accorded substantial numbers of people. In addition, it would be necessary for Congress to enact
similar legislation to protect against a subsequent
federal trial ' 2l This problem might be overcome
under the Elkins rationale which would view a
second federal trial as an intentional attempt to
subvert the laws of the state. 2 This problem is
further complicated by the issue of determining
which sovereign is to prosecute first. This problem
might possibly be solved through negotiation. 2 5
However, because negotiation may not be constitutionally required, it might be necessary for the
state and federal governments to pass reciprocal
agreements making such contacts mandatory.
A second solution would be for Congress to
simply pre-empt all areas where concurrent statefederal criminal jurisdiction presently exists." 6
Although this result seems constitutionally permissible,"' it also appears undesirable. First, it
would place a burden on the federal law enforcement agencies. Second, it seems likely that illfeeling would flow from flouting the Supremacy
Clause."' Presently, criminal law administration
m State v. Courmier, 46 N.J. 494, 509, 218 A.2d
138, 146-47 (1966).
123 Abbate v. United. States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
124364 U.S. 206 (1960). See quotation in text accompanying note 33 supra.
"2 See Note, 45 CORNE LL L.Q. 574, 579 (1960).
12
6 See Comment, Pre-Emption by Federal Criminal
Statutes, 55 COLum. L. Rxv. 83 (1955).
12 Art. VI of the United States Constitution, generally known as the Supremacy Clause, reads in part as
follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
...shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, and
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
"m Id. See also Comment, 55 CoLumr. L. REv., supra
note 126.
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is handled primarily on the state and local level.us
Most federal criminal legislation is designed either
to aid state and local authorities in their tasksss
or to preserve some special federal interest, often
of no concern to the states."' Therefore, to vastly
increase federal criminal responsibility would
displace the states from their traditional role,
involve the federal government in areas in which
they had heretofore not dealt, and, correspondingly, force the federal government to bear the
burden and expense of enlarging its crime-fighting
facilities. Further, it is indeed questionable whether
this country needs or wants to establish a national
police force.
CONCLUSION

Protection of citizens from the rigors of double
prosecutions has long been an integral part of this
country's constitutional heritage. Yet in the name
of federalism, the Supreme Court has appeared
willing to put these traditions aside where the
double prosecutions occur within a multi-jurisdictional context, even though few, if any, federal
interests are served. The Court would do better
"2See note 57 supra.
"0E.g., 18 U.S.C. §2312 (1952) (stolen autos shipped
out of state); 18 U.S.C. §2315 (1952) (stolen property
shipped in interstate commerce).
"'E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§1381-85 (crimes against the
military such as enticing desertion and harboring deserters).

to abandon its-mechanical application of dual
sovereignty principles, and instead give greater
consideration to the spirit and letter of the Constitution as embodied in the fifth amendment.
Constitutional interpretation should involve more
than dialectics. The great principles of liberty
written in the Bill of Rights cannot safely be
treated as imprisoned in the walls of formal logic
built upon vague abstractions found in the United
States Reports=
If, in fact, a new approach to the successive
prosecution problem is adopted, the courts and
legislatures should nonetheless be mindful of its
effects on this country's long Federalist tradition.
No scheme should be instituted without regard for
the roles and relationships traditionally maintained
by the federal and state governments.
The Court already appears to be giving greater
consideration to individual rights in other areas
where the dual sovereignty concept has effect.
Most important, there is no evidence that this
flexible application of the dual sovereignty rule
has had any noticeable effects on the strength of
the federal system. Hence, it is reasonable to hope
that this approach will be similarly applied within
the double-jeopardy context.
m Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944)
(Black, J., dissenting).
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PRISONER CORRESPONDENCE: AN APPRAISAL OF THE JUDICIAL REFUSAL TO
ABOLISH BANISHMENT AS A FORIM OF PUNISHMENT
Review having therefore been made of the whole matter, it has been resolved... to cut him
off from the people ... and to place him in Anathema with the following malediction ....
Let him be cursed by the mouth of the Prince of Law, whose name is Crown and Seal.
Let God blot him out of his book.
And we warn you, that none may speak with him by word of mouth nor by writing, nor show
any favor to him, nor be under one roof with him, nor come within four cubits of him, nor read
1
any paper composed by him.

In Davis v. Superior CourP one of the contested
issues was the constitutionality of a government
order 3 prohibiting the writing and publication of a
manuscript entitled "The Face of Justice." The
work was neither obscene nor libelous; it did not
advocate crime or revolution. Nevertheless, the
court upheld the validity of the order. On similar
facts, the ordinary citizen would be guaranteed a
reversal on appeal. But there was no reversal in
this case. Caryl Chessman, the author, was no
ordinary citizen. He was a prison inmate, under
sentence4 of death at San Quenton for the crime of
murder.
The first amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law... abridging the
5
freedom of speech, or of the press ....
It has been thought that these words embrace
"preferred rights," 6 and it has been held that the
government, in order to restrict expressive freedoms, must show that the exercise of such freedoms
gravely endangers some "paramount [state] interest," 7 and that there are no "reasonable alternaIA. WOISON, SPiNozo: A LirE Or REAsoN 74
(1932).
2 175 Cal. App.2d 8, 345 P. 2d 513 (1959).
3The order was issued pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE
§4570 (West 1970).
Every person who, without the permission of the
warden or other officer in charge of any State
prison,... communicates with any prisoner or

person detained therein, or brings therein or takes
thereform any letter, writing, literature, or reading
matter to or from any prisoner or person confined
therein, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
I Chessman has since been executed.
'U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6

Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). But see
Frankfurter, J., concurring in Kovaks. In Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court said: "It is
basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship
to some colorable interest would suffice...." Id. at 406.
7374 U.S. at 406 quotitsg from Thomas v. Collins,

323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944).

tives" available to protect that interest.$ Yet in
Davis, the court made no effort whatever to isolate
any "gravely endangered state interest." The
complexities involved in searching for a reasonable
alternative were thereby avoided. The court disposed of the constitutional issue quite perfunctorily: "To censor. . . and to forbid communication to and from a prison ... is not per se unreason-

able." 9 And in Lee v. Tahash,10 a case involving
issues similar to those in Davis, the court said:
Whether improper interpretation, erroneous judgement, or variant administration may be involved
in the restriction of some particular correspondence is, without more, mere institutional incident
and not matter of judicial concern."
Thus Davis seems clearly in conflict with the
principles enunciated in cases involving the first
amendment rights of free citizens. It is typical of
the seemingly anomalous results courts reach when
the first amendment freedoms of prison inmates
are at stake. To justify their decisions, the courts
employ four principle doctrines. First, courts frequently state that they lack power to interfere
with the conduct of the prison system. Second,
there is in many decisions the notion that the withdrawal of first amendment rights is necessitated
by the objectives of the penal system. Third, many
courts hold that the eighth amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishments preempts
judicial inquiry into the alleged suppression of
other constitutional rights. The fourth doctrine,
seldom articulated, holds that the prison inmate,
having been duly convicted of a crime, has forfeited
8Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90, 493
(1960).
175 Cal. App.2d 20, 345 P.2d 520 (1959).
10352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1963).
n Id. at 972.
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all of his constitutional rights and is in fact the
slave of the state.
The purposes of this comment are to illustrate
these four doctrines under current case law dealing
and to determine
with prisoner correspondence
2
whether they are sound.'
I. CoNFRuAL or AuTHoniTY Docmwr

Courts often state that they can not, or that
they will not assume jurisdiction over the com4
plaints of prison inmates. 8 In Fussav. Taylor the
inmate
to
corprison warden refused to allow an
respond with his common law wife. After a recital
of the facts, the court did little more than state
the following: 5
Courts are without power to supervise prison
administration or to interfere with the ordinary
prison rules or regulations.' 6
The conferral doctrine does seem, on its face, to
embody some sound policy reasons which militate
against judicial activism where the rights of prison
inmates are at issue. Certainly it is true that the
difficult task of administering the penal system
12
For commentaries on the first amendment rights
of prison inmates not restricted to correspondence
regulations, see Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts:
A Critique of JudicialRefusal to Review the Complaintsof
Convicts, 72 YAr.= L. J. 506 (1963); Comment, The
Right of Expression in Prison, 40 So. CAL. L. Rv.
407 (1967); Comment, Black Muslims in Prison: Of
Muslim Rites and ConstitutionalRights, 62 CoLum. L.
Rv. 1488 (1962).
1"See, e.g., Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir.
1963); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D.
Cal. 1966); Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304 (W.D.
Mo. 1964).
14168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
15The warden had testified: 'Itis difficult from the
record, to find any constructive elements whatever in
their relationship and we, therefore, do not approve
of their corresponding." Id. at 303.
16

Id., quoting from Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d.

771 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
17Sykes tells us:
Indeed, the glaring conclusion is that despite the
guns and the surveillance, the searches and the
precautions of the custodians, the actual behavior
of the inmate population differs markedly from
that which is called for by official commands and
decrees. Violence, fraud, theft, aberrant sexual
behavior--all are common-place occurrences in
the daily round of institutional existence in spite
of the fact that the maximum security prison is
conceived of by society as the ultimate weapon
for the control of the criminal and his deviant
actions. Far from being omnipotent rulers who
have crushed all signs of rebellion against their
regime, the custodians are engaged in a continuous
struggle to maintain order-and it is a struggle in
which the custodians frequently fail.
G. SYKEs, TaM SocIETY o CAPTsVES 42 (1958).

lies squarely within the orbit of executive power.
The authority of administration has been conferred both by the Constitution i8 and by statute 9
And it is a familiar principle that where power has
been conferred, sufficient discretion must accompany it so that it may be effectively wielded. 0
But the conferral of authority is not a conferral
of license. Just as discretion must follow power,
so also must judicial scrutiny. Coordinate governmental branches, and the States, must heed the
commands of the Constitution, and must respect
the individual rights it secures to the citizens.
Courts exist to insure such respect. As was said in
Lee v. Crouse,21
It is true that federal courts have no supervisory
powers over... prisons.... The executive province of administration of prisons is not a shield
against unwarranted deprivations of constitutional
rights...

2

Thus, in order to protect the executive from unwarranted interference with its administrative
duties, while at the same time ensuring that constitutional rights are not unnecessarily infringed,
judges must ascertain whether suppression of the
asserted right is in any meaningful way related to
prison administration or discipline. The necessity
"The Constitution charges the Executive with the
responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, §3. The Executive

carries out this responsibility, in part, through the
administration of the penal system.
19 18 U.S.C.A. 4042 (1969) provides:
The Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the
attorney general, shall(1) have charge of the management and regulation of all Federal penal and correctional institutions;
(2) provide suitable quarters and provide for
the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons
charged with or convicted of offenses against the
United States, or held as witnesses or otherwise;
(3) provide for the protection, instruction, and
discipline of all persons charged with or convicted
of offenses against the United States;
(4) provide technical assistance to State and
local government in the improvement of their
correctional systems.
State statutes are similar. See, e.g., ILL. Ruv. STAT.
ch.2 108, §10 (1969).
'If
I this was not permissible, the wheels of government would often be locked, and the sovereign state
find itself helplessly entangled in the meshes of its
own constitution." State of Minnesota ex ret Railroad
and Warehouse Commission v. Chicago, Milwaukee
and St. Paul Railroad Company, 38 Minn. 281, 300,
37 N.W. 782, 788 (1888).
21284 F. Supp. 541 (D. Kan. 1967).
22 Id. at

544.
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of such an inquiry lies at the heart of the conferral
doctrine.
But when confronted with an inmate's claim
that his first amendment rights were unconstitutionally infringed, the judiciary has avoided any
such inquiry, and thus has seemingly refused to
apply the very doctrine it invokes. In Davis, the
court stated that,
[The prisoner] must obviously, by the very fact of
incarceration, suffer curtailment of the normal freedoms of speech and communication. 3
If Davis had been a case in which the prisoner had
claimed denial of his associational rights, or if he
had complained that prison regulations denied
intra-institutional expression, the quoted passage
would seem to make some sense. But Davis raised
no such issues; rather, the right asserted was that
of communicating with the outside society. There
would not appear to be even a conceptual inconsistency between incarceration and the exercise of
4
such a right, let alone a factual inconsistency.2
Even if the courts expended the time and trouble
necessary to determine whether prisoner correspondence regulations bore some relationship to
incarceration or efficient penal administration,
they would probably find that no such relationship
exists. That it does not is convincingly argued in a
recent law review comment 5 At least one court
175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 20, 345 P.2d 513, 521 (1959).
See note 25 infra. In Davis the court stated:
All issues in this case flow from the fact that the
Warden of San Quentin apparently prohibited this
particular inmate from writing manuscripts for
publication. The record gives no reason for this
ruling....
175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11, 345 P.2d 513 (1959). Later in
the opinion the court said: "Such authority (to restrict
prisoner correspondence) is necessary to protect against
escape." 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 20, 345 P.2d 513, 521
(1959).
2
5Comment, 40 So. CAL L. REv., supra note 12.
But see Comment, 72 YAiE L. J., supra note 12.
Certain restrictions on the content of correspondence
seem justified. Obviously prison authorities have a
legitimate interest in preventing escapes which might
be planned through correspondence. There would
appear to be no justification whatever for volume
restrictions on correspondence which are imposed
irrespective of the prisoner's prior disciplinary record.
The only possible justification directly related to
institutional integrity seems to be grounded on administrative considerations. But even here there is ample
evidence that such restrictions increase, rather than
diminish, the administrative workload. The maintenance of the records required to enforce such restrictions alone consumes more of the censor's time
than would the reading of.many more letters. See H.
BARNES AND N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 492 (Rev. ed. 1950). The absurdity of the
23
24
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has itself recognized that such is the case. In Tyler
v. Ciccone26 an unconvicted prison inmate challenged the constituti6nality of censorship regulations which required that prisoner manuscripts be
approved by prison officials before they could be
mailed.2 Without explanation the court held that
the regulation bore no relationship to prison discipline or security.s On that ground it held the
regulation unconstitutional as applied to unconvicted inmates. Certainly it would be difficult to
construct an argument that the regulation was not
related to the discipline of an unconvicted inmate
but was related to the discipline of a convicted
inmate.
Another criticism goes not merely to the method
in which the conferral doctrine is applied (or more
properly, misapplied), but to its very terms. The
administrative argument is enhanced by the fact that
the great majority of prisoners are illiterate, or have
few contacts outside the prison walls. See R. DONNELLY,
J. GoLDsTm, & R. ScHWARTZ, CRimNAL LAW 431
(1962). It is accordingly open to doubt that a lifting of
volume limitations on prisoner correspondence would
cause even a de ininimus increase in administrative
difficulty. Prisons which have allowed unlimited correspondence privileges have found that the administrative
problems are easily overcome. Morris, Prisons in
Evolution, FED. PROBATION, Vol. 29, Dec., 1965, at 20.
There is another group of prison regulations which
prohibit the following: Correspondence with newspapers
or newspaper employees, mentioning prison news, communicating with outsiders any ideas tending to place
the prison, its officials or policy in disrepute. See Lee
v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965).
One commentator justified such regulations on the
ground that to invalidate them would mean conferring
on the prisoners the right to exercise leverage over
their captors. See Comment, 72 YALE L. J., supra
note 12. This is true, but not undesirable on purely
administrative grounds. Extension of the rule of law
to the prison community is impossible unless someone
is realistically able to subject the prison officials to
public accountability.
At least one sociologist notes the possibility that
prison regulations which prohibit inmates from publicly criticizing the conduct of prison affairs may themselves be disruptive of institutional tranquility. Sykes
states:
At certain times, as in the case of riots, the inmates
can capture the attention of the public; and indeed
disturbances within the walls must often be viewed
as highly dramatic efforts to communicate with
the outside world, efforts in which confined criminals pass over the heads of their captors to appeal
to a new audience.
G. SYKEs,

THE

SocrETY oF CAmvs 8 (1958).

In the late summer of 1970, inmates of the New York
City jails rioted for the express purpose of bringing
the inhuman conditions of the institutions to the
public's attention. Thus Sykes' observation seems
verified.
26 299 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
27 See footnote 2 of the Court's opinion, where the
regulation is set forth in full. Id. at 686 n. 2.
1 Id. at 688.
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doctrine presupposes the propriety of balancing the
first amendment against mere administrative
considerations in order to determine whether the
inmate has the right to communicate with the
outside society. But it has elsewhere been uniformly held that the government must justify the
restriction of expressive freedoms by showing that
their exercise necessarily endangers some "paramount" state interest.29 Administrative considerations do not ordinarily fit into such a category."
Another criticism that might be made of the
conferral doctrine is that it is overbroad. For if
the courts are truly fearful of interfering with the
administrative duties of the executive, one might
reasonably expect the judiciary to give the executive a wide berth of discretion in restricting the
right of prisoners to practice the Black Muslim
religion. But such has not been the case. In Banks
v. Havener"' the court confronted the following
facts:
After approximately three weeks of organized
Muslim practice... there ensued.., a violent
reprisal against prison authority causing personal
injury to some prison employees and extensive
property damage, and still another disturbance
(one month later).... "
Yet notwithstanding the very real possibility of
further administrative and disciplinary disruptions,
the court, rather than deferring to the judgement
of the prison officials, substituted its own judgement and labeled such possibilities "speculative
at best." 38

The refusal of the judiciary to meaningfully apply the very doctrine it invokes, the obvious lack
of relationship between prisoner correspondence
29 Sherbert v. Vetoer, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963),
quoting from Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1944).
20But see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
1234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.Va. 1964).
Id. at 29.

2

Id. at 30. The court said:
The probability of Muslim-inspired future riots is
speculative at best. (There is no evidence to sustain
this contention.) The antipathy of the other inmates and the staff, occasioned by the Muslim
belief in black supremacy, standing alone is not
sufficient to justify the suppression of religious
freedom in the Youth Center; neither is the alleged
disruptive effect on the rehabilitation program.
S.. To justify the prohibition of the practice of an
established religion at the Youth Center the prison
officials must prove by satisfactory evidence that
the teachings and practice of the sect create a
clear and present danger to the orderly functioning
of the institution. This they have not done.
Id.

and penal administration, the impropriety of
restricting first amendment rights on purely administrative grounds, and especially the refusal
of the courts to do so where religious rights are
involvedU all indicate an obvious truth: prisoner
The following cases illustrate the approaches taken
when the religious rights of prisoners were at stake.
In Lee v. Crouse, 284 F. Supp. 541 (D. Kans. 1967),
the petitioner alleged that a prison regulation which
prohibited Black Muslim religious services deprived
him of his constitutional rights. In deciding to reach
the merits of the contention rather than dismiss on the
pleadings, the court stated,
It is true that federal courts have no supervisory
powers over state prisons. [T]he executive province
of administration of prisons is not a shield against
-unwarranteddeprivations of constitutional rights.
The court did not explicitly enunciate the distinction
between what deprivations were warranted and which
were unwarranted. But the courts subsequent reasoning
suggested that such a determination was to be made
by ascertaining whether a deprivation was necessitated
by the need for institutional discipline.
That the Black Muslim religion constituted a threat
to prison discipline was claimed to be inherent in its
basic teachings:
This positive [Black Muslim] program has a serious
negative aspect, for its appeal is augmented by
statements, of varying vehemence, condemning
and rejecting so-called "white" social, economic,
religious, and political institutions; past white
exploitation, both real and imagined of the Negro
people; and ultimately, the white race itself.
Id. at 546. The court held that such explicit threats
constituted a danger to prison discipline, and on that
ground upheld the constitutionality of the challenged
regulation.
Though the court in Lee did not allow the Executive
unlimited discretion to suppress rights guaranteed under
the free exercise clause, the decision might be criticized
because it did not demand a higher degree of accountability. The reasoning of the case seems to rest on
considerations enunciated in Desmond v. Blackwell,
235 F. Supp. 246 (1964):
Certainly with the administratidn of a large
rison population committed to a limited personnel
, the responsible prison authorities must be
It [the regulation] can
vested with discretion....
not be dictated by the prisoners, and as to the
present issue, is reasonable, justifiable, and definitely not arbitrary or capricious [especially with
regard to Mr. Muhammed, having in mind the
inflammatory nature of his writings].
Id. at 249. The test of constitutionality according to
this case is whether the regulation is "arbitrary or
capricious." Such a test can be met by ascertaining
whether there is a conceptual possibility that the free
exercise of the religion will endanger prison discipline.
This approach has been rejected by other courts.
In Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3rd Cir. 1968), the
petitioner alleged, and the prison authorities conceded,
that members of the Muslim sect were not allowed to
receive the weekly newspaper "Muhammed Speaks."
The district court, employing a test like that invoked
in Lee and Desmond, had stated:
The plaintiffs complain they can not receive the
weekly newspaper "Muhammed Speaks." This is
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correspondence rights are unprotected by the
courts for reasons unrelated to those expressed in
the conferral of authority doctrine.
II. FRuSTRATION OF PENAL
OByEcTrvxs Docm=-

Courts often state the conferral of authority
doctrine and then, as if to clear up any lingering
uncertainties, utter the following:
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system. 35

A comparison of the conferral doctrine and the
frustration doctrine indicates that they differ only
in this: the former purports to justify retraction of
first amendment rights only if their exercise conflicts with the necessities of penal administration,
highly inflammatory material and any such refusal
is justified.
Id. at 822, quoting from Long v. Katzenbach, 258 F.
Supp. 89, 93 (M.D. Pa. 1965). But the appellate court
stated that "In so ruling the District Court misconceived the standard which is applicable to the prohibition of such literature." Id. at 822. The court rejected
the proposition that the literature could be suppressed
because it "might" prove inflammatory, since such a
proposition was speculative at best:
Mere antipathy caused by statements derogatory
of, and offensive to the white race is not sufficient
to justify the suppression of religious literature
even in prison. Nor does the mere speculation
that such statements may ignite racial or religious
riots in the penal institution warrant their proscription. The literature could be suppressed only
if the authorities established a "clear and present
danger." To justify the prohibitions of religious
literature, the prison officials must prove that the
literature created a clear and present danger of a
breach of prison security or discipline or some
other substantial interference with the orderly
functioning of the institution.
Id.
In Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967), the
constitutional status of the free exercise clause in a
prison setting was again considered, and the result was
consistent with the Long decision. In this case, however,
the court answered a question which went unanswered
in Long: would a particular method of securing prison
discipline have to yield to a reasonable alternative in
order to accommodate the first amendment right. In
Long an affirmative answer seems implicit in the court's
determination that the ciear and present danger test
was applicable. Cooper explicitly answered the question
when the court, in deciding the issues against the prison
authorities, stated that they "have not tried the course
of permitting worship services for this group under
regulation." Id. at 522.
See note 60 infra for a discussion of Barnett v.
Rodgers.
8"Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir
1951), quoting from Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266,
285 (1947).
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or, in other words, if the exercise of the right would
in some way threaten the prison's ability to isolate
the offender from society; the frustration doctrine,
on the other hand, introduces penal objectives
other than isolation for consideration.
What are the nonadministrative "considerations
underlying the penal system" which justify the
withdrawal of first amendment rights? 8 In answering this fundamental question, it is significant to
note that courts merely invoke the doctrine; they
make no effort whatever to specify which "considerations" they have in mind. This conclusory
intonation suggests that, to the extent the doctrine
is being used as an explanatory tool, the doctrine
is based on non-functional "considerations underlying the penal system." For, as will hopefully become evident, the task of relating the withdrawal
of first amendment rights to the functional penal
objectives is a highly complicated one, requiring a
good deal of sociological analysis.
Actual judicial utilization of the frustration
doctrine would seem to stem directly from the
predisposition of the public to view crime as a
peculiarly moral problem. For when a judge confronts a complaining inmate, he, like any other
citizen, confronts not merely a "deviant" whose
offense arose from merely natural phenomena or
"maladjustment." Instead he confronts a sinner
who has proven by his acts that he is an undesireable and fundamentally "immoral" being. And to
recognize in the prisoner the right to speak and
criticize would, in a significant way, amount to a
recognition that "evil" has a right to manifest
itself. The moral vision of crime can tolerate no
such inconsistency. The sinner's duty is not to
speak out and criticize his captors, and thereby
claim his sovereignty; his duty is to repent and renounce his own immorality.
The question that must inevitably be asked,
however, is whether such a non-functional justification for denying prisoners rights under the free
speech clause of the first amendment is itself functionally justified. For as Cardozo has said,
Few rules in our time are so well established that
they may not be called upon any day to justify
their existence as means adapted to an end. If they
36It should be noted that the executive is in receipt
only of power to administer the penal system. See the
discussion of the conferral of authority doctrine in the
text accompanying notes 13 to 34 supra. Hence, one
might well wonder about the relevance of these nonadministrative considerations.
The problem is taken up in notes 50, 56, and 59
infra.
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do not function, they are diseased. If they are
7
diseased, they must not propagate their kind.3
Commentators in this area of the law,8 in embarking upon a functional analysis, have, in construing
the words "considerations" underlying the penal
system, focused on the penal objectives of retribution 9 and deterrence.4 Thus, they have directed
attention only to those considerations which alledgedly exercise a directly beneficial influence on
a
society. By providing a model of analysis which
ignores the indirectly beneficial consequences which
restrictions on prisoner correspondence might
serve, the commentators have seemingly made the
frustration doctrine untenable.
It appears to be the law that
Speech is not an absolute, above and beyond control.... Nothing is more certain in modem society
than the principle that there are no absolutes, that
3'7B. CARnozo, THE NATRE Or Ta JuDicAL
PRocEss 98 (1921).
38See Comment, 72 YA=E L. J., supra note 12 and
Comment, 40 So. CAL. L. REv., supra note 12.
This penal objective is defined in the test accompanying notes 45 and 46 infra. In Comment, The Right
of Expression in Prison, 40 So. CAL. L. REv. 407
(1967), the author submits that retribution is an
irrational penal objective, and therefore fails to consider
it under his discussion of penal objectives. Id. at 411
n. 23. But dearly, the courts lack the competence to
make such determinations. See note 75 infra. Surely
the position articulated in Gore v. United States,
357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958), is correct:
In effect, we are asked to enter the domain of
penology, and more particularly that tantalizing
aspect of it, the proper apportionment of punishment.... [Whether one believes in its efficacy
or futility ... these are peculiarly questions of
legislative policy.
Furthermore, retribution has repeatedly been
mentioned as the primary reason for recognizing certain
civil (outrageous conduct) and criminal (libel) actions:
The act in question was one of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retaliation by force,
and the law, as far as it may, should afford substantial protection against such outrages, in the
way of liberal damages, that the public tranquility
may be preserved by saving the necessity of resort
to personal violence as the only means of redress.
553, 554, (1872).
Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill.
[Tihe refusal to redress an otherwise actionable
wrong creates disrespect for the law and encourages
the victim to take matters into his own hands.
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 64
n. 6 (1966).
40 This penal objective is defined in the text accompanying note 47 infra. The author in Comment, note
39 supra at 411 states: "Deterrence is discouragement
of resumed criminal activity through exposure of the

undesirble asects of prison life."
psoneote
o i rhablittin, not deterrence.
Thi,
curs,
"Thy rediect inthe sens tht they address

individuals in the free community and inform them
that imprisonment is painful.

a name, a phrase, a standard has meaning only
when associated with the considerations which
gave birth to the nomenclature"
Thus, in determining whether a specific penal
objective (e.g., retribution and deterrence) is a
sufficient justification for the withdrawal of a right,
the inquiry must be whether the fulfillment of that
objective is fundamentally inconsistent with the
rationale for protecting freedom of speech. Only if
there is such an inconsistency should the right be
deemed "withdrawn."
The policy reasons for protecting the first amendment freedoms of members of the free society are
well known. Thus the first amendment ". . was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas" 41 in the interest of ascertaining truth. The
policy consideration would seem to apply irrespective of whether the source of the idea is an
ordinary citizen or a prison inmate; in either case,
the ultimate victim of repression would seem to
be the society itself. As Mattick says,
[t]he most securely imprisoned population that
exists is the general public that is uninformed about
the nature and consequences of imprisonment as
4
practiced in America today.
This traditional policy consideration would in
no way seem inconsistent with the prison's ability
to secure an orderly society by exacting retribution
and deterring crime. In fact, not to permit inmates
to correspond with the outside society seems fundamentally inconsistent with the fulfillment of those
penal objectives.
Retribution may be functionally justified on the
ground that it maintains social order by placating
the outrage of the victim of the criminal act, or
45
that of his relatives, and associates. Were it not
for the fact that the prison inflicts pain on the
offender, it is hypothesized that such individuals
46
would seek personal vengence.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
oF PUNISHMENT 156
44 K. MNINmGER, TaE Ciz
(1966), quoting M-TTcx, Forwardto "THE FuRnE or
IMPRsoNMENT IN A FREE SocrTY", 2 KEY IssUEs
4-10 (1965).
4 Meyer, Reflections on Some Theories of Punishment, 59 J. Can. L.C. &. P.S. 595 (1968).
4 Id. at 595. There the author states:
Originally punishment was an individual responsibility, but as society developed, this type of personal vengeance could no longer be tolerated and
the individual was forced to relinquish his right
to deal personally with the malefactor, in return for
a promise by society to punish the criminal.
4Dennis
4
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But the notion that social order is achieved by
providing a kind of vicarious outrage-satiation
necessitates that the interested sectors of society
be informed of the brutality of prison conditions.
Prohibitions on prisoner correspondence, while
they do enhance the pain of incarceration, preclude
the possibility that the informational function will
be effectuated.
Under the rubric of deterrence, the penal system
admonishes the law-abiding sector of society to
continue on its law-abiding course by informing
the free society that deviance is unwise.
The social significance of punishing offenders is
that deviance is thereby defined as unsuccessful
in the eyes of conformists, thus making the inhibition or repression of their own deviant impulses
seem worthwhile.47
If the deterrent function of the prison i. to be effectuated, the prison must effectively inform
society of the painful aspects of imprisonment. But
prohibitions on prisoner correspondence seem to
do little more than prevent just that from happening.
Accordingly, restrictions on prisoner correspondence seem directly contrary to the penal
functions of deterrence and retribution.
A functional justification of the withdrawal of
first amendment rights under the rubrics of deterrence and retribution would seem to be defective
for a second reason. It has been held that first
amendment rights may be suppressed in the interest of a paramount state interest (here, social
order and the rule of law) only where there is no
reasonable alternative to that suppression.48 But
if the state's interest is the preservation of social
order, and if social order is preserved only through
fullfillment of the penal objectives of retribution
and deterrence, then it should follow that a reasonable alternative exists. For the penal objectives of
retribution and deterrence necessitate only the
infliction of pain for their fulfillment. 49 Surely, the
quantum of pain inflicted can be preserved through
substitution of an alternative for the restriction of
first amendment rights.
4

50

7Toby,
Is Punishment Necessary? 55 J. CRIm. L.
C. & P.S. 332, 334 (1964).
48 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90, 493
(1960).
49 Meyer, supra note 45 at 595.
-oFor instance, the term of imprisonment might be
lengthened. This raises an interesting question. Only
the legislature could take such action, since the executive is not clothed with the powers of an avenging
angel. This suggests that only the legislature can be
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These two criticisms of the attempt to justify
the withdrawal of first amendment rights by citing
the necessity of the penal institution to exact
retribution and deter crime do not mean that the
frustration doctrine itself is unsound, but mean
only that the commentators have been wrong in
limiting their inquiry to these two penal objectives.
The error lies in thinking that the withdrawal of
first amendment rights can be of utility only because it enhances the quantity of pain which the
prison is capable of inflicting on its inmates. What
must be noted is the qualitative effect which the
withdrawal has. For the truth seems to be that
imprisonment does not involve merely the restraint
of physical liberty in an unpleasant environment.
True, imprisonment encompasses that description,
but there is more. Properly conceived, it constitutes
complete social severance; and in fact it is more a
matter of severing associational ties (which are
also protected by the first amendment) of every
kind than it is an abridgement of freedom of movement. Imprisonment, in a word, is banishment.
Banishment-or the invisibility of the imprisoned inmate-then (which is only possible because
of restrictions on first amendment rights) is the
concept whose social efficacy must be tested. It
has been noted that
As long as the public continues to view crime as...
'a contest between good and evil,' their interest
extends only to the point of public resolution,
if there is one. And the point of public resolution
is the conviction which brings the public drama of a
trial to an end. The judge pronounces sentence and
the public feels that justice has been done. They
seem to forget, altogether, that life goes on in
prison and beyond.5
If it is true that the public's "forgetfulness" that
life goes on in prison is the result of its view that
crime is predominantly a moral, as opposed to a
naturalistic, problem, then it is a view that is
fostered, or at least supported, by restrictions on
allowed to justify the infliction of pain on grounds of
the need to exact retribution and deter crime.
But, at least in the case of federal prisoners, Congress
has not explicitly withdrawn first amendment rights.
And it has delegated only the power of administration,
which as has been argued does not necessitate the
withdrawal of first amendment rights. See the discussion of the conferral of authority doctrine.
The question then becomes: How can the executive
justify its actions on grounds which only the legislature
could invoke? This is a further indication that the
state's interest in punishment (qua infliction of pain)
does not justify restrictions on prisoner correspondence.
" MENNINGER, note 44 supra, at 155-56.
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inmate correspondence. If so, such restrictions
should be maintained at all costs, since nearly all
criminologists agree that it is the moral view of
crime that discourages criminality, and is the real
deterrent of deviance 2
Hiding the prisoner from society may also be
beneficial because it prevents the establishment
of a visible, criminal "counter-culture." In this
capacity, Sykes notes:
If the inmate population maintains the right to
argue with its captors (the society), it takes on the
appearance of an enemy nation with its own
sovereignty; and in so doing it raises disturbing
questions about the nature of the offender's deviance. The criminal is no longer a man who has
broken the law; he has become a part of a group
with an alternative view-point and thus attacks the
validity of the law itselfA'
Preventing prisoners from informing the society
of the painful aspects of incarceration through correspondence may also protect the penal system
from being destroyed by an internal contradiction
that it may possess. Thus it might be hypothesized
that a punishment, in order to deter crime, must
provoke fear; but if it provokes fear, it will not be
tolerated by the citizenry. Sykes voices the
contradiction as follows:

prison riot, the .fact that the prisoner generally
returns to society, and the fact that the prison
officials and employees are members of the free
community all provide informational links between the prison and the populace. Thus society is
familiar with the painful aspects of prison life; but
the clarity of its perception is not sufficient to
spark it to action and demand reform.
These may appear to be cynical observations.
But the question is not whether they are cynical,
but whether they operate for a broader social good.
If they do, then the justification for prohibiting
prisoner correspondence is ultimately that the
prison is not a "democratic" institution; in other
words, it is not an institution that can serve its
function of banishing criminals and preventing
crime while at the same time being exposed to
direct public scrutiny. If this is the case, then that
fact negates the entire rationale for conferring first
amendment rights on prison inmates. Applicability
of the first amendment presupposes that a net
social benefit will arise therefrom. 6

16
See note 50 supra. It may be said in resolving the
separation of powers problem therein noted that a
prisoner has a right to be free of executive action which
is only justifiable (because enhancing the deterrent
and retributive capacities of the prison) because it
enhances the pains of incarceration. Said another way
the prisoner may be said to have a "right" to have his
And in fact large segments of our society would
pain prescribed only by the legislature.
much prefer to forget about the confined offender,
But the suppression of the first amendment rights
of prisoners can be justified on grounds other than the
for no matter how just (and efficacious as a deterinfliction of pain. The question then changes. It is no
rent) imprisonment may be, the free community is
longer whether the legislature has prescribed the rereluctant to face the conclusion that some men
striction, which it has not; but rather whether the
5
must be held in bondage for the larger good. '
courts can be confident that the recognition of the
"right" will not result in a net social detriment. It is
Restrictions on prisoner correspondence insulate precisely bcause courts cannot make this determination
they appear justified in refusing, to recognize the
the society from such a moral dilemma, and in- that
existence of first amendment "rights." Thus it becomes
hibit the democratic process from operating to re- totally inappropriate to even speak of first amendment
solve it in favor of the prisoner. At the same time, "rights" in prison. In view of that fact, it is irrelevant
consider whether the executive is acting strictly in
such restrictions do not completely preclude the to
accordance with the specific instructions of the legislasocial knowledge of the pains of incarceration which ture. He does not abuse his discretion by invading a
deterrence itself necessitates. The occasional non-existent "right."
Perhaps this is what the court in Lee v. Tahash,
5
2Andenaes, The GeneralPreventive Effects of Punish- 352 F.2d 970 (8th. Cir. 1965) had in mind when, after
holding that the first amendment did not apply to
ment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 956 (1966).
prison affairs, it stated:
63G. SYKs, TnE SocTay OF CAPTIVEs 75 (1958).
5
Thus the fact that the prison authorities, have
Id. at 8.
refused to allow mailing of some particular letter
55Andenaes states that "although little research
...does not of itself afford basis for a prisoner to
has been done to find out how much the general public
try to get into the federal courts. Nor will the
knows about the penal system, presumably most
fact that particular refusals seem to him to conpeople have only vague and unspecified notions. Therestitute improper interpretation of the prison
fore, only quite substantial changes will be noticed."
regulations, or erroneous judgment on the letters
Andenaes, supraz note 52 at 970.
themselves, or different treatment on relation to
Thus if restrictions on prisoner correspondence
them than he feels has occurred as to some other
insulate the public from the often barbaric aspects of
prisoner..., of itself give rise to any justiciable
prison life, they would also insulate it from the more
issues.
treatment-oriented aspects of future prisons. Thus
rehabilitation might be accomplished without sacrificing Id. at 972 (emphasis added).
These considerations, however, do not seem entirely
deterrent and retributive efficacy.

STUDENT COMMENT

It must be pointed out there there are no known
sociological authorities that directly support the
contention that restricting prisoner correspondence
is in any way socially beneficial. No one seems even
to have considered the question. But the fact that
the above considerations must be deemed "speculative" in the sense that their validity has not been
proven, should not be used as an excuse for judicial
activism.5 It is enough that the contentions are
not per se unreasonable. Here, the words of Justice
Jackson seem relevant:
When the issue is criminality of a hot-headed
speech..., or circulation of a few incendiary pamadequate in disposing of the objections to maintaining
that the withdrawal of first amendment rights can be
functionally justified by non-administrative considerations. It would seem clear (or at least is assumed
by this author) that the withdrawal of these rights
could be justified if the legislature had, by law, worked
the forfeiture. Surely its judgment in matters of
penology must be deemed conclusive. The judiciary
cannot be allowed to second guess the legislature in an
area where courts are so ill-equipped to make determinations. The difficulty is that while the legislature
might have worked the forfeiture, it has not; the
executive has. And the executive, like the courts,
seemingly has no particular expertise in this area (the
areas of the non-administrative penal considerations);
nor is the executive a law-making organ. The question
is one of presumptions. Where the legislature has
acted, there is a presumption of rationality. Where the
executive has acted in the absence of legislative authorization (and in an area where the executive's
jurisdiction is not exclusive) the reverse presumption
seems to attach.
The most satisfactory answer to this problem lies
in history. At common law, the forfeiture of rights
was worked by operation of law. See notes 78-81 infra
and accompanying text. All presumptions were, by
judicial act, turned against the convict: even the right
to life itself arose only by act of legislative grace.
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 796
(1871). The implication is that, at least at common law,
legislative silence meant acquiescence to the common
law rule. Thus the executive would have been free to
act, not because the legislature conferred authority,
but because it did not withdraw that authority.
With these historical antecedents, it is not unreasonable to attach the same presumption of legislative acquiescence to the fact that the legislature has
not specifically prohibited the executive from interfering with the "right" of prisoners to use the mails.
In this setting, the fact that the judiciary itself is
incapable of determining whether such restrictions are
beneficial or harmful to the society should be deemed
decisive.
6 Morris states:
Prison, the basic sanction of criminal justice,
must be preserved until its alternatives and its
modifications are demonstrably of greater social
utility. In our present ignorance of the effectiveness
of our armory of punishments against criminals and
of their educative and deterrent effects on the community, experimentation,cannot be precipitate ....
Morris, Prisons in Evolution, FED. PROBATION, Vol. 29,

Dec., 1965, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
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phlets ... it is not beyond the capacity of the
judicial process to gather, comprehend, and weigh
[but here]
the necessary material for decision ....
we must appraise imponderables .... The judicial
process simply is not adequate to a trial of such
far-flung issues. The answers given would reflect
s
our own predilections and nothing more.
This, then, is the primary defect of the frustration doctrine: it suggests an analysis which courts
9
are incapable of undertaking. Fortunately, and
as has been noted, courts have employed the
doctrine in a conclusory fashion, and have avoided
0
the quagmires of penology. The doctrine should,
Is Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568, 570
(1951).
55
But this is not a suggestion that courts abandon all
efforts whatever to determine whether the exercise of
a right in the prison is proper. To so conclude would
amount to justifying a retreat to the obviously unsatisfactory conferral of authority doctrine. Judges can
hold the prison officials to account when the deprivation
they inflict cannot in any reasonable way be related
to any possible penal function. Thus non-recognition
of the rights to equal protection and due process of
law would seemingly prove intolerable even in prison,
since the rights to procedural fairness and even-handed
treatment in no way conflict with any possible penal
function, and are fundamental to even the most rudimentary sense of justice.
Similarly, judges seem warranted in recognizing the
existence of rights under the free exercise clause.
Religious activities are socially perceived as duties,
especially with regard to convicted criminals. Thus
they are not properly revocable under the rubrics of
retribution and deterrence, since these penal objectives
seem satiated only when privileges are withdrawn.
Further, granting religious rights could in no way be
conceived of as being inconsistent with the prison's
capacity to banish offenders.
61The avoidance has not been universal. In Barnett
v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the prisoner,
a Black Muslim, claimed that prison authorities were
violating his constitutional rights under the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Specifically, the
petitioner alleged that prison authorities had denied
his request to be fed at least one pork-free meal daily.
At the trial, a Muslim minister stated that the religious
prohibition of pork was a "life or death matter." Id.
at 998.
The trial court, noting that no dietary privileges
were afforded the inmate practicioners of other religions
in the prison, held that there had been no denial of
equal protection and on that ground dismissed the
action. Id. at 999.
The appellate court remanded on authority of cases
dealing with the first amendment rights of unincarcerated citizens. In so doing, it held that prison authorities could not infringe upon the right to free
exercise without showing that such freedom endangered
a paramount state interest, and without showing that
there was no reasonable alternative available to protect
that interest.
The frustration of penal objectives doctrine was
invoked and turned into an instrument of judicial
activism. The court demanded on remand that the
government show why the prisoner's rights under the
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however, be abandoned, for it is just such an ill
advised venture which it invites, and further, to
the extent that the courts avoid the temptation
thus posed, the doctrine is an utter failure as an
explanatory tool.

III.

EIGHTH AIIENDENT PREEmmON

DocTmNEn
Courts occasionally employ the notion that the
judiciary is empowered with authority to challenge
the conduct of prison officials only when they have
transgressed the eighth amendment's proscription
of cruel and unusual punishment." The validity of
the notion that judicial scrutiny of the first amendment complaints of prison inmates is preempted
by the eighth amendment seems to have been assumed by the court in Lee v. Tahash, a case which
upheld the validity of restrictions on inmate cor-

respondenceA' The court stated:
free exercise clause were necessarily withdrawn by the
"necessities underlying the penal system." Id. at
1000-01.
The court stated that "however attractive the end
to be acheived, the means employed must hoard first
amendment values." Id. at 1000. The court then
supplied the rationale for employing such a test:
Treatment that degrades the inmate, invades his
privacy, and frustrates the ability to choose pursuits through which he can manifest himself and
gain self-respect erodes the very foundations upon
which he can prepare for a socially useful life.
Religion in prison subserves the rehabilitative
function by providing an area within which the
inmate may reclaim his dignity and reassert his
individuality.
Id. at 1002. See note 59 supra, where an attempt to
explain the special status accorded religious expression
is made.
61"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
6 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965).
63In this case, the inmate's demands seem to have
been clearly unreasonable.
[Appellant] insisted that..., he had a right to
send communications to any public officials
throughout the United States that he desired.
He sought to send out some such letters in sealed
envelopes, in disregard of the censorship provisions.
He wanted to mail letters to the highest official
levels possible making request both for general
information and for a vast abstract miscellany of
federal and state statutory sections, chapters,
codes, procedural rules, court decisions, etc. Thus,
he addressed a letter to one of the senators from
California, of which state he claimed to be a native,
setting out a page-full of such material that he
wanted sent to him. He wanted to address inquiries to the Superintendent of Documents and
to others about obtaining various statutory sections. He wanted to address a request to one of the
federal district judges for Minnesota for legal advice on what it might be possible for him to try

To illustrate justiciability, unlawful administration
can exist where there are aspects of institutional
treatment of such character or consequences as to
shock general conscience or to be intolerable in
fundamental fairness. Such treatment is entitled to
be held within the ban of the Eighth Amendment as
representing cruel and unusual punishment and so
constituting unlawful administration of prison
sentence."
The court continued:
It will not ordinarily be possible to bring the actions of prison officials as to correspondence-privilege into this category ....
"
The doctrine appears to be widely relied upon,
though seldom so deliberately and clearly stated
as in Lee. In Childs v.Pegelow,5 the court stated:
It clearly appears to be the general rule that, except
in extreme cases, the courts will not interfere with
the conduct of a prison, with the enforcement of its
rules and regulations, or its discipline.67
And in Labat v. McKeithens" the court said:
to do to get a state-court conviction in California
set aside.
Only a part of his correspondence attempts
have been mentioned.
Id. at 973.
"Id. at 972.
66Id. The court also stated:
Whether improper interpretation, erroneous judgment, or variant administration may be involved
in the restriction of some particular correspondence
is, without more, mere institutional incident and
not a matter of judicial concern.
Id. at 972.
66321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 932 (1963).
6Id.
at 489 (emphasis added).
"243 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1965). In Labat, a
particularly harsh case on its facts, the plaintiff, a
Negro prison inmate under sentence of death, had
been placed in solitary confinement to await execution.
While in solitary he had been corresponding with a
white woman who lived in Sweden. This correspondence
was terminated when the plaintiff became the object
of public interest because of his numerous appeals in
which he had sought to overturn his conviction. In
answering the woman's inquiry as to why the correspondence had been terminated, a prison official had
written:
Please be advised that you have been denied
correspondence privileges because of existing
rules and regulations set forth by the Office of the
Warden in keeping with the laws of the State of
Louisiana. Under said laws, correspondence is not
permitted unless the correspondents are of the
same race.
Id. at 664. But the court ignored this evidence of
official lawlessness and held that it did "not... have
the power to supervise or regulate the ordinary control,
management and discipline of the inmates of prisons

STUDENT COMMENT
If the state has the right to deprive him (the
prisoner) of his very life... then certainly it has
the right, as a part of the ultimate punishment, to
deprive him of other privileges along the way to the
final reckoning.6 9
The preemption theory does not seem to suffer
from the major difficulties seen in the conferral and
frustration doctrines. Perhaps most important, it
sets forth standards which are intelligible and
judicially cognizable--whether the treatment of
the prisoner is "shocking to the general conscience"
or "intolerable in fundamental fairness"-and
therefore meets, rather than avoids, the important
issues involved in restricting prisoner correspondence. For the doctrine explicitly holds the first
amendment does not apply to prisoners, unless the
specific deprivation involved is cruel and unusual.
Since the Lee court held that the first amendment
does not of its own force apply to convicted
criminals, no questions arise as to whether it is
proper to balance first amendment "rights"
against the deeds of prison administration. For the
obvious import of the preemption doctrine is that
upon conviction, the criminal's rights are automatically converted into privileges in so far as the
conversion does not amount to a cruel and unusual
punishment. Similarly, because there is no recognition of a "right" the judiciary avoids the impossible
task of determining whether prohibitions of
prisoners' correspondence is necessitated by the
penal objectives. 0
operated by the states." Id. at 666-67. The court
stated:
If the state has the right to deprive him of his very
life..
. then certainly it has the right, as a part of
the ultimate punishment, to deprive him of other
privileges along the way to the final reckoning....
Id. at 666.
The prisoner had been placed in solitary confinement pursuant to a state statute providing:
Until the time of his execution, the convict shall
be kept in solitary ...and no one shall be allowed
access to him without an order of the court....
Id. at 663. The court construed the statute as follows:
Solitary confinement means complete isolation of
the prisoner from all human society .... If a
person in solitary confinement were to be permitted to communicate in writing... he would
have access.. . at least in a limited sense....
Id. at 665.
69Id. at 666.
70As the court in Lee itself notes, the principle of
eighth amendment preemption seems too broad to
explain the results reached in many cases involving
the complaints of prison inmates. The court stated
that unlawful administration of the prison sentence
exists when the prison officials trench on rights secured
"absolutely" to the inmate. Among these rights, the
court states, are those of communicating with the
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Notwithstanding the strengths of the preemption doctrine, however, the approach taken by Lee
raises a question which the court fails to resolve.
Why, upon incarceration, are the prisoner's correspondence rights converted into privileges? This
seeming anomaly can be justified on a functional
level.
The cruel and unusual punishment clause, according to the implications of the preemption
doctrine, guarantees rights which are not subject
to revocation by the fact of incarceration, no
matter how persuasive the penal objectives. To
hold otherwise would reduce the clause to a nullity,
for the claims of retribution and deterrence are
always persuasive. 71 Further, as Andenaes has
pointed out:
It was never a principle of criminal justice that
crime should be prevented at all costs. Ethical
and social considerations will always determine
which measures are considered "proper." As Ball
has expressed it: '[A] penalty may be quite effective as a deterrent, yet undesirable.' 7
courts, and to the free exercise of religion. Lee v.
Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965).
Although the court did not attempt to do so, the
recognition of these "absolute" rights could, it would
seem, be reconciled with the general rule of preemption.
Denial of the right to communicate with the courts
would seemingly amount to a denial of the right of a
wrongfully convicted inmate to attack his conviction
through habeas corpus. But applicability of the preemption doctrine presupposes lawful conviction.
Denial of the right to communicate with the courts
might also amount to a denial of the prisoner's right
to assert the very right which the preemption doctrine
accords to him-the right to attack the administration
of his sentence as unlawful under the cruel and unusual
punishment clause. Applying the preemption theory
in such a case would be self-defeating and illogical.
Recognition of the prisoner's right to free exercise of
religion does not seem inconsistent with the preemption
doctrine. The doctrine presupposes that the deprivation
inflicted can properly be said to be a punishment-that
is, it presupposes that the withdrawal of the right is
conceptually related to the principles underlying the
penal system. There is no such relationship in the case
of religion, as has elsewhere been noted. And in fact,
whereas free exercise is undoubtedly a right vis-&-vis
members of the free society, for the prisoner it would
seem to become a positive duty.
71 It seems reasonable to conclude that as a general
rule, though not without exceptions, the general
preventive effect of the criminal law increases with
the growing severity of penalties. Contemporary
dictatorships display with almost frightening clarity the conformity that can be produced by a ruthlessly severe justice.

Andenaes, The GeneralPreventive Effects of Punishment,

114 U. PA. L. Rav. 949, 956 (1966).
72 Id. at 957. Andenaes also states:
Tihe prerequisite of general prevention is that the
law be enforced. Experience seems to show that ex-
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Thus an absolutist construction seems fully warranted.
Analysis of first amendment rights yields an opposite result. An absolutist construction has never
been adopted,78 because these rights confer freedom
in a positive sense, and the exercise of such a freedom always presupposes some form of net social
benefit. In order for the judiciary to make the
judgment that the exercise of correspondence
rights will be socially beneficial (because unrelated
to penal objectives), it would of necessity be plunging into the domain of penology. In view of inherent limits on juristic knowledge,7 4 courts seem
functionally warranted in avoiding such a quagmire by simply refusing to hold that the prisoner
has rights under the free speech clause of the first
amendment. The Supreme Court may have had
just such considerations in mind when it refused
to impart a "substantive due process" content to
the cruel and unusual punishment clause.7 5
cessively severe penalties may actually reduce the
risk of conviction, thereby leading to results contrary to their purpose. When the penalties are not
reasonably attuned to the gravity of the violation,
the public is less inclined to inform the police, the
prosecuting authorities are less disposed to prosecute and juries are less apt to convict.
Id.7 3at 970.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 508.
74For the dangers involved if the judiciary were to
engage in the practice of penology, see the quoted statement from Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
The dissenters apparently do not consider retribution
to be a "rational" penal objective. See also Comment,
40 So. CA. L. REv. supra note 12, in which a student
writer makes the same judgment. The author also
states: "Deterrence is discouragement of resumed
criminal activity through exposure to undesireable aspects of prison life." Id. at 411. This is not deterrence,
but rehabilitation. See notes 45-46 supra.
See the discussion of Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995
(D.C. Cir. 1969), in supra note 60. The court takes
special note only of rehabilitation. Is it, by judicial fiat,
dismissing all other penal objectives because some
humanitarians think they are irrational? See also Meyer,
supra note 45. Meyer seems to dismiss all penal objectives except rehabilitation.
Compare Andenaes, supra note 52. The author, a
Scandanavian criminologist, instead of dismissing traditional penal theories, calls for detailed research to determine
7 its efficacy.
1InRudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963),
the dissenters suggested that the content of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause was to be ascertained
by determining necessity:
Can the permissible aims of punishment (e.g., deterrence, isolation, rehabilitation) be achieved as effectively by punishing rape (for instance) less severely than by death (for instance) (e.g. by life
imprisonment); if so, does the imposition of the
death penalty for rape constitute "unnecessary
cruelty?"
Id. This view has not been adopted by the Supreriie

IV. SLAvE OF THE STATE Docmn
This doctrine was explicitly stated in Rufin v.
7
CommonwealthU in 1871:
He (the prisoner) has, as a consequence of his
crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his
personal rights except those which the law in its
humanity accords to him. He is for the time being
7
the slave of the StateY
Perhaps embarassed by its harshness, the courts
have not enunciated it since that date.
The slave of the state doctrine differs from the
frustration doctrine in two significant respects.
First, it does not purport to justify the forfeiture
of rights by any "considerations underlying the
penal system." Second, and of course related to the
first, the forfeiture results not upon imprisonment,
but upon the commission of the crime, or, in other
words, upon the entry of the judgment of guilt.
These properties suggest that the doctrine is
not to be explained upon a functional level, but
upon a purely historical one.
At common law, when sentence was pronounced
for a serious crime, the offender was, by operation
Y
of law, placed in a state of attainder ' The princiCourt. The reasons supplied in Comment, The Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
CriminalLaw, 79 HAzv.L. REv. 635 (1965), seem controlling:
Indeed, the fundamental difficulty with the "legislative ends" approach suggested by the Rudolph
dissent is that it involves questions that, because of
limitations on juristic knowledge, in many instances
do not yield even reasonably clear answers. More-.
over, even if penalties could be ranked by degrees
of deterrent effect, the social value of any increase
in deterrence would presumably have to be
weighted against the added hardship inflicted. Are
courts to undertake the task of deterappellate
mining (and
to make constitutional questions turn
on their determination) whether a sentence of ten
years for robbery will result in significantly more
deterrence than one of five years (and whether the
benefits of any added deterrence justify the penalty)-or whether a particular defendant must be
isolated from society for only the shorter period of
time-or whether work on a prison farm would
better effect his rehabilitation than confinement in
a penitentiary?
Id. at 643.
76
62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790 (1871).
7
Id. at 796.
7
8 Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall (U.S.) 333, 387 (1866).
The Court stated:
The word attainder is derived... from the words
attincta and attaintura, and is defined to be "the
stain or corruption of the blood of a criminal capitally condemned; the immediate inseparable consequence of the common law, on the pronouncing the
sentence of death."
Id.
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pal incidents resulting from the attainder were
forfeiture of the criminal's estate,7 0 corruption of

his blood,80 and civil death.8'
Of principle interest here is civil death, for it
would seem obvious that the slave of the state
doctrine is little more than the reassertion of this
common law incident. Civil death may be defined
as follows:
Civilly dead is the state of a person who, although
possessing natural life, has lost all his civil rights

and as to them is considered dead. 82

Though it appears that few jurisdictions have
statutorily embraced civil death as an incident of
the commission of crime, some have.8 One such
statute provides as follows:

A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for
any term less than life or a sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for an indeterminant
term ... forfeits all the public offices and suspends, during the term of the sentence, all the

civil rights, and all private trust, authority, or
powers of, or held by, the person sentenced.8 4

Notwithstanding the general paucity of civil
death statutes in the United States, it would seem
that the vestiges of the common law incident persist in statutes providing for the loss of citizenship
upon commission of crime8 5 The similarity of result follows because citizenship is nothing more

than "the right to have rights".0
7 Holmes v. King, 216 Ala. 412, 413, 113 So. 274,
275 (1916).
0Id. The corruption of blood forbade either the

receipt or transmission of property by inheritance, and
estates were forfeited to the crown.
81Id.

82d.
8'
E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §2600 (West 1970).
84 N. Y. CIviL RiGHTS LAW §79 (McKinney Supp.

1970-71).
8

ILL. REv. STAT. ch.108, §49 (1969).
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren,
C. J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Warren, speaking for
the dissenters stated:
Citizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less
8

1 E.g.,
6

than the right to have rights. Remove this priceless
possession and there remains a stateless person, dis-

graced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen.
He has no lawful claim to protection.... His very
existence is at the sufferance of the state within
whose borders he happens to be. ... This government was not established with power to decree this
fate.
Id. at 64-65.
In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), the dissenters
prevailed. The court stated that "citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the National Government."
Id. at 91. But that position must be considered dicta in
view of the conclusion that it was denationalization-
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CITIZEN: A member of a free city or jural
society, possessing all the rights and privileges
which can be enjoyed by any person under its
constitution and government. ....
Thus there would appear to be a necessary equivalence between loss of citizenship and civil death.
Additionally, it is perhaps significant to note
that while virtually all jurisdictions have explicitly
abolished the common law incidents of forfeiture of
estate and corruption of the blood,"' none, so far
as is known, has expressed its desire through
statute to eliminate civil death. In view of the
general rule that the common law survives unless
explicitly repudiated by the legislature, judges
would appear to be justified, in the presence of
legislative silence, in imposing the incident of civil
death upon convicted criminals.8 9
Yet judges have not explicitly invoked the incident since Ruffin v. Commonwealth in 1871. But
they continue to cling to the historical notion that
the convicted criminal is civilly dead and is the
slave of the state. The universal application, but
patent unsoundness, of the conferral doctrine has
already been noted. Invocation of this doctrine
seems to suggest the teaching of the slave of the
state doctrine: the prisoner comes into court with
all the normal presumptions of worth and dignity
(the presumptions appertaining to citizenship)
turned against him. It seems inescapable that it is
not the conferral doctrine which provides the
turning the person into a stateless person-that was at
issue. The court stated that denationalization may not
be "inflicted as a punishment, even assuming that
citizenship may be divested pursuant to some governmental power." Id. at 94. Use of denationalization was
deemed to be prohibited as a cruel and unusual punishment.
8
BLACiK's LAW DIcTIONARY 310 (4th ed. 1957).
s8 18 C.J.S. Convidcs §3 (1961).
89
In Holmes v. King, 216 Ala. 412, 414, 113 So. 274,
276 (1916), the court said: "In the absence of statute,
the doctrine of 'civil death' has been generally denied in
this country." The cited authority was Byers v. Sun
Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 139 P. 948 (1914). The
Byers case, as did the Holmes case, involved the right
of the prison inmate to deal with his own property.
When property rights are involved, the Holmes statement that civil death is no longer the rule in the absence
of statute may be correct. But the quoted passage is incorrect when political rights are being considered. As
the court said in Byers,
When a person is convicted of a felony, he is deprived of his political rights, such as the right of
suffrage, the right to hold office and to participate
in the affairs of government, and, besides this, he is
deprived of his liberty to roam at large, which are
forfeited to the state....
41 Okla. at 735, 139 P. at 950. See generally Comment,
supranote 83; Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1308 (1942).
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rationale for denying the existence of the convict's
rights; rather, it is the convict's lack of rights in
the first instance which explains the utilization of
that doctrine.
Though it is true that the frustration doctrine
might provide a rational foundation for denying
recognition of the inmate's first amendment rights,
it is significant to note that courts employ the
doctrine in a conclusory manner, without ever
supplying even the slightest hint of a functional
analysis. This suggests that courts are not primarily motivated by functional considerations,
but are in fact employing the doctrine as a synonym of slave of the state doctrine.
Similarly, utilization of the preemption doctrine
seems to rest on an unexplored presupposition that
the eighth amendment preempts applicability of
the first. Though the doctrine appears, like the
frustration doctrine, to be susceptible to rational
justification, it would seem probable that invocation of the preemption doctrine is better explained
as being nearly synonymous with the slave of the
state doctrine.
Finally, the continued vitality of the slave of
the state doctrine would seem, more readily than
any of the other doctrines, to explain the refusal
of courts to resurrect the holding of Coffin v.
Reichard:0
A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary
citizen except those expressly, or by necessary
implication, taken from him by law.9'
For the crucial fact that Coffin overlooks is that
historically the prison inmate has not been viewed
as an ordinary citizen whose liberty is being restrained; rather, he has been viewed as a person
who has graphically demonstrated that he is not
entitled to the presumptions appertaining to
citizenship, of which the "retained rights" presumption, as well as any presumption favoring
free speech, are examples. Whether one says that
the prisoner is the slave of the state, or is placed
in a state of attainder by operation of law, the result is the same-Coffin's holding must be reversed:
The prisoner retains none of the rights of an ordinary citizen, except those expressly, or by necessary
implication, given to him by law.
This, of course, is nothing more than a restatement
of the holding of Ruffin v. Commonwealth.
0o143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
887 (1945).
91Id. at 445.

If issue were taken with the idea that it is the
slave of the state doctrine which breathes life into
the other doctrines sub silentio, at least it is true
that it accurately describes the actual status of
the prisoner when the other doctrines have been
invoked to refuse the inmate relief from the oppression of the prison officials. Thus, whether the
slave of the state doctrine be regarded as the underlying explanation for, or merely as the consequence
of, judicial intonation of the other doctrines, the
result is the same: the inmate is subject to the
whim of the prison officials in the enjoyment of
nearly all of his privileges. He is in fact the slave
of the state.
Little attention has been directed to a critique
of this doctrine. Perhaps this is explained by the
fact that the doctrine has not been explicitly embraced since 1871. Inattention, however, seems
unwarranted not only in view of the doctrine's sub
silentio vitality even today, but also in view of the
fact that the doctrine appears to be constitutionally
sanctioned.
As a matter of pure intent, and wholly independent of any functional considerations, the first
amendment cannot be said to extend to prison
inmates. On its face, the first amendment is a grant
absolute in its terms. But when the Constitution
was enacted, the common law rule of civil death
was equally absolute. And it must have been well
known to the Framers. Thus it must be concluded'
that prison inmates formed no part of the class of
persons which the constitution was intended to
protect,
for if the language, as understood in that day,
would embrace them, the conduct [of the Framers]
would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent
with the principles which they asserted; and instead
of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and
received universal rebuke and reprobation.92
As was said in Ruffin,
The bill of rights ...has the same force and
authority which it has always had, neither more
nor less... [it is, and always was] a declaration
of general principles to govern a society of freemen,
and not of convicted felons .... 9
The notion that the bill of rights was not generally intended to protect prisoners is buttressed
by the language of the thirteenth amendment:
9

2Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1856).
91Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790,
794, 796 (1871).

STUDENT COMMENT
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisidiction.94
Thus slavery is constitutionally authorized as a
form of punishment. It is equivalent to loss of
citizenship or civil death, and necessarily comprehends non-applicability of the Bill of Rights where
95
prison inmates are concerned.
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII.
95 The scope of the deprivation which the thirteenth
amendment authorizes hangs on the construction to be
given the terms "slavery and involuntary servitude."
In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court
construed these words when it stated the purpose of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866:
Congress [assumed] ... to declare and vindicate
those fundamental rights which appertain to the
essence of citizenship, and the enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential distinction
between freedom and slavery.
Id. at 22. If this construction is adopted, the scope of
the deprivation authorized by the thirteenth amendment for prisoners includes all those "fundamental
rights which constitute the essential distinction between
freedom and slavery."
The rights protected by the first amendment fall
squarely within that category. They constitute the very
essence of freedom. See Emerson, Toward A General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YAs;E L. J. 877
(1963). The author states that freedom of expression is
indispensible to the attainment of truth, and enables
each member of society to participate in social decision
making.
Slavery as punishment for crime-which the thirteenth amendment authorizes-seems necessarily to
exclude the existence of rights inextricably associated
with the presumptive dignity and worth of the individual citizen. The concept of slavery is the antithesis of
the notion that man is noble. Thus a recognition that
"suppression of ... expression is an affront to the
dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature"
(Id. at 881), means that the denial of first amendment
freedoms is again to be conceived of as part and parcel
of the idea of slavery.
Some lower court federal cases have adopted a narrower construction of the terms "slavery and involuntary servitude." In Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805
(W.D. Mo. 1968), the petitioner, awaiting trial for an
alleged Dyer Act violation, charged violation of the
thirteenth amendment in that he was being treated as
if he were a convicted inmate. Specifically, he alleged,
inter alia, suppression of first amendment rights. The
court held there was no violation of the thirteenth
amendment in that the inmate was not required to perform labor without compensation. Id. at 814. The court
also noted, without specification, that unconvicted inmates had more privileges than convicted inmates. This
case seems to reject the broad construction of the thirteenth amendment that the Civil Rights Cases suggest.
See also Tyler v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Mo.
1964); Johnston v. Ciccone, 260 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Mo.
1966); Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
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CONCLUSION

The origins of the slave of the state doctrine lie
deep in history. The earliest precursor of this doctrine appears to be the ancient penalty of outlawry
which existed at an early stage of Roman history.
The penalty resulted in the ousting of the offender from society and the deprivation of all
rights. Damaska tells us:
The outlaw's children were considered as orphans,
and his wife a widow. Besides losing his family
rights, he also lost all his possessions and even his
right to life [if we can use that expression], for
anybody could kill him with impunity. 6
In ancient Greece, a more humane approach,
"infamy", was adopted.
It entailed the loss of all rights which enabled a
citizen to influence public affairs, such as the
right to attend assemblies, vote, make speeches,
and hold public offices.9
Modern societies, almost universally, have abandoned the harshness of outlawry in favor of the
alternative of infamy." Thus there is universal
judgment that the prison inmate be excluded from
the right to exercise political rights-those rights
which enable him to influence the life of the community he has offended. More specifically, the
prison inmate typically suffers the following deprivations: loss of citizenship, loss of the right to vote,
loss of the right to be elected to public office; disqualifications from positions of influence, prohibitions on public appearance, and disqualification
from serving in the armed services. 99
Thus when confronted with inmate complaints
that prison officials have infringed upon rights
guaranteed by the first amendment, the courts
have been asked to repudiate the consistent judgement of history and of the contemporary world
societies and hold that prisoners have the right to
exercise an influence upon the public affiairs of the
community. For if the first amendment guarantees
anything, it (in conjunction with the right to vote)
guarantees the right of participation in social
decision-making. 0O
9 Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction
and Their Removal: A ComparativeStudy, 59 3. CRI.

L. C. & P. S. 347, 350 (1968).
9Id.
at 351.
91Id. at 356-60.
99 Id.

100The protection given speech and press was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people....
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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PRISONER CORRESPONDENCE

The universality of this judgment, then, is one
factor which helps explain the reluctance of courts
to hold that prisoners may exercise rights which
they claim arise under the free speech clause of the
first amendment. Another, perhaps, may be the
feeling that the banishment of the offender is just.
The notion that the prisoner's duty is to maintain
his silence as a manifestation of repentence in the
face of his previous immorality has a certain immediate persuasiveness. In contractual terms, the
idea that the state is entitled as a matter of equity
to rescind the social contract following the offender's breach is perhaps not unappealing.
On the functional level, judicial reluctance to
change the status quo is enhanced by the inherent
limitations on juristic knowledge, for judges are
incapable of dealing with the many and complex
questions which entry into the domain of penology
would necessarily require them to answer. In an
area where there appears to be so much uncertainty-even for criminologists°L- the possibility
that judicial activism would result in diminution
of the prison's capacity to secure an orderly society is great indeed. And the result of error well
might mean social catastrophe.
There can be no doubt that if the courts adhere
to their present course of judicial restraint, they
will be sanctioning results which seem harsh and
inhuman. They will be holding that the pronounce101See generally Andenaes,

supranote 52.

ment of excommunication which introduced this
comment does not present justiciable issues.
It is in the very harshness of this position that
the most rational blueprint for change is to be
found. Thus if denial of the prisoner's right to communicate with the outside society today seems
harsh and inhuman, it may, with the passage of
time, be held so intolerable in fundamental fairness, and so shocking to the general conscience as
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
In themselves, restrictions on prisoner correspondence may not seem capable of rising to the
level of gross and shocking indignities; but such
restrictions must be viewed in a context of the
nearly absolute isolation the modern penal institution imposes. In such a context the crucial connection between the inmate's identity as a human
being and his need to manifest himself through the
fundamental act of speech may be recognized. As
Sykes has observed,
In a very fundamental sense, a man perpetually
locked by himself in a cage is no longer a man at all;
rather he is a semi-human object, an organism
with a number. The identity of the individual, both
to himself and to others, is largely compounded of
the web of symbolic communications by which he
is linked to the external world; and as Kingsley Davis has pointed out, "... . the structure of the hu-

man personality is so much a product of social
interaction that 0when
this interaction ceases, it
2
tends to decay."'1
1o2SvxEs,

supra note 17, at 6.
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RECENT TRENDS IN TEE CRIMINAL LAW
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In People v. Tenorio, 3Cal.3d 89, 89 Cal. Rptr.
249, 473 P.2d 993, (1970), the California Supreme
Court overruled its prior holding in People v.
Sidener, 58 Cal.2d 645, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697, 375 P.2d
641 (1962), and held that a trial judge has the
discretionary power to sentence violators of the
Health and Safety Code of California as firsttime offenders irrespective of similar prior narcotics convictions. In so holding, the Court determined that §11718 of the State Health and Safety
Code, which placed sentence discretion exclusively
with the prosecutor, invaded the judicial province,
and thereby violated the state constitutional
provision for a separation of powers.
The companion case to Tenorio, People v. Clark,
3Cal.3d 97, 89 Cal. Rptr. 253, 473 P.2d 997
(1970), raised the additional question of whether
an automatic and supplementary sentence for
recidivism was cruel and unusual punishment. The
judge in the trial court had deemed "brutal" the
state's statutory requirement of a mandatory
fifteen year minimum sentence without possibility
of probation or parole in cases where there were two
or more prior convictions for narcotics possession.
The California Supreme Court in Clark proceeded
to hear argument on the question of the possible
8th amendment violation, but then decided
Tenorio, and did not feel compelled to reach the
constitutional issue. The court nonetheless expressed a willingness to reconsider the issue in appropriate circumstances.
INDIGENT IMPRISONMENT

In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), the
Supreme Court held that where the total time of
an indigent's imprisonment exceeded the maximum
period fixed by statute (that is, where the fine
which accompanied the jail sentence could be
"worked off" by further imprisonment at a prescribed rate per day), an invidious discrimination
resulted based upon a defendant's ability to pay
his fine. Thus, under the rubric of the fourteenth
amendment equal protection guarantee, the Court
invalidated an Illinois law which permitted the
imprisonment of an indigent criminal defendant
"in default of payment of a fine beyond the maximum authorized by the statute regulating the

substantive offense," 399 U.S. at 241. The Court
did not feel that its holding would upset any compelling state interest in view of the reasonable
alternatives to indigent imprisonment as a means
to meet fines and costs. The California Supreme
Court in In re Antazo, 3Cal3d 100, 89Cal. Rptr.
255, 473 P.2d 999 (1970) has extended the application of the Williams decision. The indigent
defendant in that case was sentenced to probation,
but his freedom was conditioned upon payment of
costs and fines, nonpayment of which subjected
him to "work-off" in jail at a prescribed rate per
day. Following the reasoning of Williams the
court held that imprisonment of an indigent in
those circumstances constituted a violation of equal
protection of the law. The reasoning and analysis
of Williams and Antazo laid the foundation for
prohibition of incarceration for the involuntary
nonpayment of a fine in Tate v. Short -U.S.(3/2/71).
APPLICATION OF CoL

mN v. ALABAMA

In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), the
Supreme Court applied the test of Powell v.Alabama, 287 U.S. 451 (1932) and United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) to determine whether
the preliminary hearing in Alabama was a "critical
stage" in the State criminal process. The Powell
and Wade test required the Court to examine
"whether potential prejudice to defendant's rights
inhere[d] in the ...confrontation", and whether

the presence of counsel would help to avoid that
prejudice in the preliminary hearing. The Court in
Coleman held that the preliminary hearing was a
"critical stage" in the Alabama criminal process
and that the accused was entitled to have counsel
present.
IThe court in Coleman found the preliminary hearing
to be a critical stage because:
First, the lawyer's skilled examination and crossexamination of the witness may expose fatal weaknesses in the state's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in
any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by
an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the state's
witnesses at the trial. Third, trained counsel can
more effectively discover the case the state has
against his client and make possible the preparation
of a proper defense to meet the case at trial. Fourth,
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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRMINAL LAW

The doctrine of Coleman was considered in five
recent cases.2 Each court compared the preliminary
hearing in the Alabama criminal process with the
preliminary hearing in its own jurisdiction and
found the hearings procedurally similar. Each
court reversed former holdings to the effect that a
preliminary hearing was not a "critical stage" of
the criminal process. Therefore, the accused in
each of these jurisdictions now has a constitutional
right to counsel at the preliminary hearing stage.
However, in applying the retroactivity test of
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), to the constitutional requirements of Coleman in each case,
the courts held that Coleman would be applied
prospectively.
SEAncH AND SEzuRE

In Lockridge v. Sup. Ct. of L.A., 89Cal. Rptr.
731, 3Cal.3d 166, 474 P.2d 683 (1970), a police
search of the defendants pursuant to a legally
insufficient search warrant, produced a gun which
through subsequent investigation linked them with
a two year old robbery. The search itself was part
of an investigation of unrelated crimes. The police
then contacted witnesses to the two year old robbery who identified the defendants and testified at
their trial. The Lockridge court faced the question
whether the identification of the defendants by
those witnesses to the robbery and their subsequent
testimony at trial should be excluded as fruits of
the unlawful search and seizure. The California
Supreme Court held that such evidence should not
be excluded because the witnesses' testimony had
been acquired independent of the illegal search.
Furthermore, suppression of the gun as the product
of an illegal search, it was said, alone adequately
served the purpose of the exclusionary rule in deterring unlawful police conduct. However, in United
counsel can also be influential at the preliminary
hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early
psychiatric examination or bail.
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
2Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.
1970). Konvalin v. Sigler, 431 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir.
1970)* People v.Adams, 46 ll.2d 198, 263 N.E.2d 490
(19705; Billings v. State, 267 A.2d 808, 10 Md.App. 31
(1970); Commonwealth v. Brown, 214 Pa. Super. 709,
269 A.2d 383 (1970).
3The Stovall test considered,
a) the purpose to be served by the new standards;
b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards; c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the standard. 388 U.S. at 297.

States v. Edmons, 39 U.SL.W. 2251 (2d Cir. Oct.
5, 1970), the court excluded identification evidence
and dismissed the indictment of four defendants
who were taken into custody by the police pursuant to an arrest unrelated to the identification.
judge Friendly, writing for the majority, contended
that "flagrantly illegal arrests made for the precise
purpose of securing identifications that would not
otherwise have been obtained" could be discouraged only if such identifications were subject to
the exclusionary rule.
In People v. Flowers, 23Mich.App.523, 179
N.W.2d 56, (1970), the court ordered a new trial
and granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained by searching the accused's room
without a search warrant. Although the defendant's father gave valid consent for the search of his
teenage son's room, the court held that, because
the son is the real defendant to the action, only he
can waive his own fourth amendment right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure. The
court reasoned that "a person who has no personal
and punishable involvement in the crime suspected
or charged" cannot waive another's right not to
be subject to unreasonable search. Therefore, in
this case of first impression, the Michigan court
has carved out a personal fourth amendment right
for the juvenile which cannot be waived by another
person who has no personal and punishable involvement in the minor's crime.
RiGHT To FRE TRAwSCR PT

In Magezia v. Municipal Court of City and
County of San Francisco, 3Cal.3d54, 473 P.2d 353,
88 Cal. Rptr.713 (1970), the Supreme Court of
California held that the United States Supreme
Court did not require a free trial transcript to
indigents in all cases, and reasserted that a statement of facts provides an adequate basis from
which to bring an appeal. In Magezia, the majority
found that the petitioner had not attempted to obtain a settled statement of facts, nor had he shown
by a "reasonably particularized presentation" why
such a statement would have failed to inform the
reviewing court of the alleged grounds for petitioner's appeal. The dissent argued that the burden
of demonstrating the adequacy of anything other
than a transcript as a basis for preparing an appeal
should rest with the state, particularly since in the
instant case, the defendant claimed that he could
not reconstruct crucial portions of the trial proceedings from memory.

STUDENT COMMENT
MIRANDA PROBLEMS

In United States v. Jackson, 429 F.2d 1368, (7th
Cir. 1970), the court indicated that seventh circuit
courts "... may reconsider the application of the

harmless error doctrine" to Mirandawarning cases.
It held that in the Jackson case, although the trial
court erred in admitting statements which defendant gave to police without receiving a prior Mirandawarning, the trial court's error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because there existed
uncontradicted evidence of defendant's guilt
independent of his statements to police.
The seventh circuit had previously applied the
harmless error doctrine in three similiar cases,
United States v. Stutt 415 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir.1969);
United States v. Wick, 416 F.2d 61, (7th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Frank, 409 F.2d 958 (7th Cir.
1969). The Jackson court noted that cases involving harmless error were "swarming around the
seventh circuit like bees," and warned that continued disregard of the Miranda decision by law
enforcement officials may require the court to
reconsider the application of the harmless error
doctrine to these cases.
The seventh circuit in United States v. Dickerson,
413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969), held that Miranda
warnings must be given to a taxpayer by either a
revenue or special agent at first contact with the
suspect after his case has been transferred to the
Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service. Recently, the first and third circuits rejected the seventh circuit's holding in Dickerson.
The first circuit, in United States v. Mitchell,
432F.2d354, 8 Crim.L.Rptr. 2077 (1st Cir. Oct.
7, 1970), found no plain error in admitting incriminating statements given by the defendant to
the IRS special agents without a Mirandawarning.
The third circuit, in Jaskiewicz v. United States,
433F.2d415, 8 Crim.L.Rptr. 2021 (3rd Cir. Sept.
28, 1970), specifically rejected the reasoning of
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Dickerson, holding that the sole test for the admissibility of a taxpayer's statements to agents of the
Treasury Department is the voluntariness of such
statements. The Jaskiewicz court relied on its preMiranda rule, and rejected the reasoning that
Miranda rights arise when the taxpayer becomes
the focus of a potential indictment by the Intelligence Division of the IRS. Instead, the court declared that Miranda rights arise only when the
government has restrained the taxpayer's freedom
of action in some meaningful way during his questioning. The court felt that meaningful restraint
did not include the psychological effect which
questioning may have on a taxpayer who is made
aware of the possibility of criminal sanction under
the Internal Revenue Code.
Addressing itself to the question of who has
standing to object to the admission of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda,the Supreme Court
of Alaska in Dimmick v. State, 473 P.2d 616 (1970),
held that a robbery defendant cannot defeat
the admission of an accomplice's incriminating
testimony at trial by asserting that the accomplice's original confession was obtained in violation
of Miranda. The police in Dimmick admitted to
securing the accomplice's confession after disregarding his request for legal counsel, and further
conceded that their sole purpose in eliciting the
accomplice's confession was for its value in convicting the defendant. Relying on an interpretation of the constitutional roots of the Miranda
decision, i.e. the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause, and opinions in People v. Varnum, 66
Cal.2d 808, 59 Cal.Rptr. 108, 427 P.2d 772 (1967)
and People v. Denham, 41 1ll.2d 1, 241 N.E.2d 415,
(1968), an equally divided court in Dimmick
affirmed the conviction, noting that the Miranda
protections adhere to each individual personally,
and therefore provoke judicial censure only when
personally violated.

